Like a fellow Robert-derived, paradigm-shifting sensation, de Zerbi can often struggle following Escapology. Even the most ardent and polemical critics of de Zerbi rarely question his teams ability to play through the initial wave of pressure brought on by the opposition, but rather question more abstract elements like the risk and reward of the process, the reliance on the opposition to create the conditions for space to arise or more broadly the functionality of the press-baiting itself. It is the lattermost element that I want to focus on with this article, particularly the requirement to cover large amounts of space against physically dominant sides who seek to dominate space in the oppositions half. The best of which are City (and Arsenal; however, this article was already getting out of hand with contingencies so I attempted to limit it), so they are the natural focus. Essentially, what comes after Escapology against teams which press high, but have physically dominant players who excel in their duels over space, making the beneficial conditions crafted by playing through pressure more questionable, and thus altering the risk/reward calculus.
Against City, Brighton would quite often commit 7 players deep within their own final third - the reasoning behind this being the desire to create the plus 1 versus City and enter a game of cat-and-mouse; a Mexican standoff where each team step-by-step commits another player deeper, opening space in the increasingly vacated 2nd and 3rd and beyond. This is a tactic Guardiola himself often engages in; however, there are crucial differences in practice of this more theoretical element. Guardiola’s teams typically adopt wider spacing around the goalkeeper to attempt to create time and space for the goalkeeper to aim a long pass. They are seeking to draw in and then catapult forward, using the physical presence of Erling Haaland to play off of, then have him and typically Kevin de Bruyne attack the space in behind. This is where the player profiling and qualitative aspect comes into play, as they are transitional specialists who can eat up space quickly, take advantage of the large gaps, make the crucial timing decisions and generally best their respective defenders. Moreover, there is a greater element of the ‘ball moving to you’ present in City’s player which requires less dynamic movement to create options and space, and rather seeks to continually stretch the pitch - which again has qualitative aspects, as better players can be left more isolated, and can have a more liberated, more principle-based path of progression rather than something automatised or based around third man patterns.
Contrastingly Brighton lack those players to build around, and thus, adopting a plug and play mentality to this approach against Manchester City would not be appropriate as Welbeck and Pedro would likely be dominated when going long (the precondition behind the stretching being having players capable of being isolated and more of a principle-based game model when facing a high, hybrid-press like City’s (fun caveats!)). When Brighton do practice this type of attacking strategy, it is typically oriented around finding and isolating the wingers rather than central players compared to City, because there is a greater likelihood of winning the initial ball, even if the results are typically worse once the initial contest for possession has occurred. City practised this before Haaland, typically with Foden and Sterling running behind to get onto Ederson balls - showing that what City can do with universalists often isn’t abstractly applicable, and perhaps shouldn’t be the standard to perceive possession-oriented coaches (whatever that means), particularly in pursuit of pragmatism, which many ironically lament Pep for adopting.
When adopting a baiting to play long strategy against man-to-man marking, the fundamental question which requires an answer is whether stretched spaces and numerically light conditions suit your players more than theirs. It should moreover be noted, that unlike some teams where de Zerbi does adopt a more direct approach towards these situations, Manchester City are not so rigid in their man-to-man marking as to not press the goalkeeper, which is pertinent when electing how to build, and whether to play into pressure.1 Essentially, through pressing the goalkeeper the +1 is often temporarily reestablished, and de Zerbi’s teams typically adopt the strategy of ‘playing into pressure’ - which involves using a bounce pass to go around the player tasked with pressing both the centre back and goalkeeper to find the free man.2 Against more rigid man-to-man, as City adopted more last season in the 1-1 after winning the title, Brighton were more inclined to go long.
Therefore, Brighton looked to build around the pressure, with the crucial spaces in attempting to do this being the half-spaces, as they compact the centre with tight spacing between the central players which makes a more direct release from the goalkeeper more difficult, but frees up room for the dropping forwards to receive as the unnatural compaction combined with man-to-man marking frees up space. They maintain constant width through the full backs moreover to amplify this.
However, does this really adapt around the qualitative problem, as the dropping forwards themselves are man-marked, and thus are under pressure instantly upon reception. All this work is put into creating space for them to receive but it is questionable whether this is even beneficial. Because of the depth of Brighton’s play moreover, and the fact City players are in closer proximity generally as they are behind their respective Brighton players, the person in possession often lacks a direct connecting option, requiring the receiver to hold up possession - emphasising the importance of individual talent moreover.3 This is something Guardiola recommends himself against man-marking teams more abstractly - slow down the pace of the game rather than instantly attempting to turn the opposition - take the extra touch to allow play to flow around you, or play the additional pass before the transitional release; use the advantage of timing and initiation to your advantage.
However, for Brighton, because they had committed so many men deep, even taking these extra steps was unsuccessful, provided it was possible with Nathan Ake breathing down your neck, because there was no support and the player in possession could not turn. Thus, you are often left in a predicament where even a successful outcome of escaping the pressure frequently leads to a turnover, or a resetting of play. Entrance into the half-space itself is an odd goal because there is a lot of danger inherent, as Brighton even demonstrated to City in the 2nd minute of this game, Phil Fodens desire to turn lead to a turnover with Brighton facing play - that is not to say its not an admirable or good goal, but rather one naturally fraught with danger and which requires support against tight marking systems looking to bounce on central passes.
There is a passage of play roughly 8 minutes into the game which perfectly encapsulates the problem of short-distance Escapology, where the aim seems to be to attract and work out the details later, rather than build towards something positively progressive. Essentially the time Steele takes in possession allows City to adopt their hybrid pressing structure and overload the side of the pitch play will be directed down preemptively. From these situations, it is often more advantageous to go long and play into spaces, or bait to play to an automatised hoof Antonio Conte style after making the opponent think you they have you penned in. They play a series of one-twos out of play on the near-side because the space was too compact and controlled to get out of successfully, despite superficial appearances of having done so. Rather, because of the small distances, they should have a plan on how to use the compaction to benefit them, which is finding the far-side or central spaces ad seeking to then exploit City’s overland. This reasoning is moreover why I think the ‘plug and play’ Italian textbook automatisms criticism is often unfair, because Conte in particular adopts a very different approach in playing against more intense pressure, often being more inclined to hit space early. De Zerbi sits at the other end of the Italian spectrum, with the likes of Inzaghi and Sarri sitting somewhere in between both. In this example the short-emphasis leads to them getting pinned, despite superficially pleasing play with clean technical actions all round.
Nevertheless, as it pertains to the match, it is for these reasons I typically prefer a 4-2-4 shape for most teams as the lateral spread across the front 4 allows for better connections and opens up the wider long pass to contest in deeper areas if required - formations are often phone numbers, but in more static conditions based around dynamic space occupation, the starting position is often important - and in a more positional paradigm, having the exits in more static positions is important in spreading the pitch and effectively exploiting the advantage (think KDB-Mahrez 2v1 overload to isolate scenarios)
However, you have to empathise with de Zerbi, because quite frequently against City you are caught between a rock and a hard place. If you adopted the more stretched approach, the likelihood is either City allow the goalkeeper extra time in possession whereby Steele progresses and attempts to launch it in behind to wider regions (where the extra numbers for City allow them to better dominate space - and this is the positive outcome in contrast to a turnover or pressured ball), or you recycle in the direction of pressure until you are required to make an incision to the half-spaces, where although their will be greater support around the ball, the lack of central compactness makes potential turnovers more directly dangerous (despite them occurring farther away from goal, contrary to popular opinion, I think the deep central 3 and desire to play around the box is concerned more with - or at least a more effective form of - rest-defence).
Ultimately, the fundamental question I want those criticising de Zerbi to answer with regards to trade-offs. What are the pragmatic alterations you desire to produce better outcomes, if the issue concerns risk and coverage of large spaces/questionability of some of Brightons attacking players, particularly when considering injuries (although the detractors rarely apply this level of charity).
Should they go long? Doesn’t that create similar issues with regards to questionable hold-up and ability to fight through contesting duels from their attackers. It nullifies risk? Over what timescale, and does it necessarily or does it just create the visceral sensation of safety in microcosmic form because you are nullifying the direct threat of a scary turnover near the goal, in favour of allowed dominance and progression from the opponent, working under the presupposition of lacking physicality in players (making longer duels difficult as well) - there are moments to limit timescale and variance which make this concept more applicable, but I doubt the validity of it over larger - more than say 20 minutes, timescales. Moreover, what positive threat do you offer in this example, as it is an ideology based more around damage limitation as the issue of transitions nevertheless remains.
The issue de Zerbi critics have is often more fundamental and oriented around his style of play holistically, and the player profiling it entails to allow it to flourish - the prioritisation of technical players, or older players with more experience at the cost of physicality. I think this is a very fair, and perhaps the most valid criticism of de Zerbi.4 It just so happens the critics of de Zerbi are often the same people spouting there is more than one way to play football rhetoric.
Returning from the polemic, perhaps more charitable interpretation of the criticism would edge more towards risk aversion while continuing to practice the general principles de Zerbi espouses regarding the minimisation of randomness. Commit fewer players to build-up, make the conditions more stretched and the style itself more positively vertical, looking to attack space in attacking areas quicker rather than getting bogged down in the box or the corners through attempting one too many wall passes when the option to turn was open.
However, while thinking the broad strokes of this criticism holds value, it's often for the opposite reasons than is commonly championed. The reasoning behind this is vicissitude related; it doesn't actually make them more ‘defensively’ solid. The quicker the ball goes forward, the quicker it goes back; the larger the spaces, the more conducive the conditions are to transition. By taking extra touches and playing extra passes, Brighton quite often are negating risk, even if that is not the explicit reasoning. By not attempting to transition vertically, they are lowering the risk and reward of any opportunity.5 They get trapped in particular areas, often the corner which produces a set-piece, more often than not a throw-in. This logic cannot be extended ad infinitum, as not all space is created equal but pressing structures typically show play wider, and Brighton are often built around quick, sharp, short, central progression if play does move inside. Essentially through being more directly vertical in their build, as people suggest, Brighton would likely increase their attacking potency, but be worse from a rest defence perspective, which I think would lead to even more criticisms of naivety, rather than more. Nevertheless, I think there is something to be said about better embracing the risk and reward in microcosm.
It ultimately comes down to comparative advantages as well - whenever Brighton face teams of City or Arsenal’s quality, what they elect to do will almost always produce a net negative outcome because of the difference in player quality. However, they need to look at where they can produce a relative advantage, and the creation of space in deep areas to help launch transitions and create space via attraction is one of them, even if it seems suboptimal.
Rather awkwardly for those in the de Zerbian sphere, this is where we have to admit, what we call artificial transitions do have real distinctions from more typical transitions once attacking space. The primary is that between actual defensive structure and rest defence. While rest defence is crucial element towards building a team which can sustain pressure and nullify transitions, the typical nature of attacking generally means play is nevertheless more dynamic. Structured defending, even man-orientated to a large extent (hence creating degree of dynamism through movement) typically has more contingencies in place, and planned, with the routes of arrival and exit being more predictable as they are based to a greater extent on a consistently applied legible structure which follows more specific patterns, compared to the more abstract elements of rest defence, which require greater adaptability, because of the greater uncertainty caused by transitions. This is not to suggest artificial transitions are completely legible and stable things, but rather, the bounce of the ball typically has less of a pronounced impact, with goals and ways of attaining those being more pre-determined. This predetermination arguably creates more consistency when working successfully, but moreover, it generates readability for the opposition in the planning of their pressing structure, while your build-up structure is not exempt from the influential effect of their given defensive structure in influencing how play is built, and eliminations dealt with. Particularly against Arsenal, who are specialists in pressing recovery, this can make the art of Escapology seem superfluous.6
There is also the method of space creation necessary for artificial transitions to occur which must be adapted around the opposition, for Brighton this typically means a series of short passes as play condenses to then release to a player marked back to goal to find the third man - against good pressing sides like City - they are often thinking a step ahead, and planning to use the escape as a trap, building around and attempting to exploit your own proficiency - then it becomes more a game of timing and duels than superiority of structures.
A good example of this occurs at about the 4th minute - they attract play over to their left flank and manage to switch it centre back to centre back from there. Van Hecke encourages the jump from Gvardiol with his fake pass out wide finding Welbeck in the half space, who then has no option. The intensity of City’s pressure makes it seem like there are no real free man, as the attacking players cover the ground so quickly that all Brightons players are actually behind the ball. In this instance, the rigidity and deep commitment of Brighton leads to them not following the flow of play and being a step behind City in the process, who have players ready around the ball upon the breaking of pressure. This is where I think valid criticism of commitment can be made, as the deep commitment was predicted on a game of cat and mouse they were physically unable to compete in. This lead to no actual supporting options to be created for the subsequent transition - the creation of space subsumed the actual aim which is the attacking of space to create chances. Having three central players deep and static (or moving towards the ball) to create separation from their markers who would leave them once they began venturing into the box (unless the ball-oriented press had already been triggered).
When you watch, you are left questioning how City somehow have created a 4v2 situation in between the lines despite maintaining constant pressure and compactness around the ball and not failing for a second to keep Brighton players under pressure. Part of this then relates to game-state, it is the beginning of the game where City can likely press with the greatest amount of intensity with these bursts then being subdued by calmer in possession approaches and a greater willingness to sit off Brighton. This flexibility on City’s end likely makes a more attrition-based recycling strategy from Brighton less conducive to success - also the greater aimlessness (or more so lack of capacity and consideration towards the grander aim of attacking space) of Brightons build-up means a more decisive turnover without any net swing is likely to occur towards City, with an altered game state allowing City in turn to be more passive and bringing forward another one of Brightons foibles.
However, it should also be noted, whenever Brightons players were able to get their sole on the ball (he said the thing!!!), the were able to better play through pressure - the issue in large part was an inability to create dynamic separation from markers while maintaining time in possession. This time and space was probably the marked difference between City and Arsenal in the games I watched, where Arsenal allowed more time to allow for more recovery contingencies compared to City’s more intense commitment. The way to beat a more man-oriented press is to create distance between yourself and the marker and force them to overextend in intensity and use that overcommitment against them through third man combinations (or more riskily and player-dependant - dribbling/turning). However, these instances also occur more often in more natural transition moments which sit in the uncanny valley between artificial and ‘real’ transitions against teams like City through reconsolidate of possession following a turnover. Consider the 7th minute example where Ederson tries to hit Alvarez long in behind after being granted time in possession - Steele is able to recover possession, and off the ball the pitch is unnaturally stretched due to this turnover, creating increases of distances and allowing more deep dynamic movement, even if Brighton take time to regain a degree of structure in possession. This sequence more than anything emphasises the importance of vertical separation in building through man-orientation as back to goal reception has a compacting effect in allowing the opposition to pin and contain as City done throughout this game.
Against Arsenal in the 2nd minute, the advantage of space to create time on the ball through the ‘uncanny valley’ transitions of building it backwards over large spaces appeared. I call these ‘uncanny valley’ because they emphasise the important aspect of detachment against man-orientation and using space as a weapon for separation to allow for quicker combinations, as you split and then move towards the ball, with de Zerbi’s teams often playing in the direction of pressure to spring forward (think the opposite of Pep Lijnders first pass forward principle - Bright play backwards to open up space to spring forward, attempting to use dynamic superiorities). These happened more frequently comparatively against Arsenal, and correspondingly Brighton had more joy.7 This was because Arsenal did not pin them back with the same effectiveness in possession, meaning turnovers occurred in a higher area for Brighton, allowing them to build back and use space more dynamically when the had the ball for more vertical transitions - this was largely due to Arsenal’s build-up preferences and greater willingness to go long, leading to more turnovers in the middle of the pitch.
This could generate the question of whether going longer more frequently, and being more willing to adopt a more defensive shape could have positive attacking externalities for de Zerbi’s teams, as it allows more middle third transitions to occur, and thus generates a game-state with more space in it naturally, while the opponent is less settled, while patterns based on deep build up can nevertheless occur. I’m unsure where I sit on this, and don’t really think it applies against City because they are better able to hold the ball against Brighton's pressure meaning fewer opportunities from possession losses (forced or unforced) are likely to happen. But there might be something there, even if when deciding what strategy to adopt against a physically dominant press who might struggle to hold the ball for longer durations (mid-table high pressers who specialise in that over possession aspects perhaps).
The static nature of Brightons play could lead you to believe they were intending on building longer through the +1 with time in possession more similarly to City and hit the wings earlier. Inferring motivation from outcome is where difficultly arises as City were so intense in their pressure. But it seems structurally plausible that was their intention - recycle until time is created to go longer - the deep central 3 play more of a spatial role, while going to the wide FBS and GK often suggests a desire to find players with time and space. But then again, the insistence on playing through the half-spaces suggests the opposite - as too does the deep central three, unless they trusted more simple combination play after winning the initial duel. Nevertheless, Brighton adopted both options with regularity against bigger sides, so variation was also possible; however, most pertinently the option of going longer in a controlled manner was negated by City’s pressure.
I think an important note moreover is City’s use of fluidity in this game with players constantly interchanging positions to work against Brightons more rigid man-marking. And I think this type of fluid play style is probably one de Zerbi would never adopt, but also one never really afforded to him as it comes down to the qualitative aspect of having players who are more universalists, comfortable receiving all over the pitch and dribbling. However, in microcosm, I think it almost encapsulates the point of this article well, as though the options arguably haven’t been afforded to him, the rigidity of play style makes me think he wouldn’t use them regardless, and constantly come up with novel solutions like Guardiola. He wouldn’t utilise the flexibility having a player like Bernardo offers you, which potentially places a cap on his ceiling. Even in this game, KDB appeared all over the pitch (despite what relationists my tell you).8
This evolotuion against man-marking was something I covered last year, as ‘horizontal fluidity’ particularly when afforded to a few attacking players is something which can upset man-marking schemes by creating +1’s across the pitch. City adapted their pressing and possession approach, while Brighton remained with greater continuity. This is why I think comparisons between Pep and de Zerbi are lazy. While there could be no de Zerbi without Pep, the former is still very Italian in his make-up as a coach, and shares many more similarities with his compatriots in style of play, even if he emphasises possession. Ultimately, Pep is restless, and an obsessive adaptor, and thus has integrated elements of de Zerbi’s play into his game. Even in this game the more fluid possession-based approach, while not de Zerbian, included moving towards the ball a lot from players, something Pep is quite ardently against in most situations, and you will hear many interviews where he complains about players running to the ball to much, and wanting it too much (think what Henry says) but, he recognised the potential for utility in this game and therefore adopted it. I think the same can be said about a coach like Arteta vis à vis adaptability. De Zerbi however; I am more sceptical, and I think this scepticism is what makes some bigger clubs anxious.
The intensity did drop as the match progressed with Brighton being able to establish more possession outside of their box as City looked not to be too stretched, but the intention remained the same nevertheless, even if their were more periods of rest possession - force passes into the half-spaces and make sure a defender is always tight to pounce to create a forward facing turnover. This plays into City’s strategy and ideology of ‘not tackling’ but showing more generally from the forward two lines, and the overall idea was to contain and compact play through controlling these dropping forwards of Brighton to suffocate them and generate dangerous turnovers. In showing play to the half-spaces through guidance-based pressure moreover, City were often more able to generate more dangerous turnovers.
As this relates to de Zerbi’s future, and the extent to which future clubs should perceive this as a weakness then becomes pertinent, as many things should theoretically become increasingly less important as he scales the footballing ladder and is able to attain more complete player profiles. However, he is not a milquetoast Pep disciple, but is rather than an independent gamechanger in his own right which is potentially why clubs are cautious to hire him, as there is a greater degree of variance associated with potential outcomes, as he is simultaneously polarising and innovative.
Hopefully this article has came across as more than de Zerbian apologia and actually looked to examine the issues of attempting to make play more static through a discourse on options, potentialities and trade-offs. Ultimately though in football, having better players gives you more options, which in turn, makes those previous options which would be specialised in, in a lower budget environment, even stronger as the opponent has to prepare around multiple contingencies, while the potential to adapt makes you more of a Swiss-army knife. Right now it is difficult to tell definitively whether de Zerbi is a Swiss-army knife coach (I suspect not), and his time at Shakhtar has thus far been the best demonstration of how he would adapt to a more dominant environment (maintaining similar principles with different shaping and spacing) but nevertheless, I still think he ready for the top level. And whatever should happen in the rest of his career, he already belongs in a rare elite of the pantheon of greats for changing the game.
Even off the ball, City were able to adopt some even numerically overloaded pressing situations because of the faith in their defenders recovery, I think Gvardiol at around the 30th minute overzealously jumping, leaving space in behind, then seamlessly recovering, allowing the best of both worlds, a tool not available to de Zerbi. Nevertheless, I conjecture the preference for rigid man-marking would remain for him when given this type of player.
It is for this reason moreover that I would adopted a more stretched 4-2-4 shape because it allows you to play in the direction of play over more stretched distances.
Hopefully negating this false dichotomy of automatisms vs individual quality - as automatisms are contingent upon, and very often adapted around individual quality rather than being this abstract thing.
Although trade-offs related to budgets and a choice of having to specialise come into consideration.
Or delaying and amplifying the trade-off depending on which side you are conceptualising it from.
This argument pertains to rest defence in the middle and final third predominately.
Although types of defensive intensity and what sort of turnovers Arsenal and City seek to generate moreover are important and something I will explore in a follow-up article - in short, Arsenal is more m2m generate back to goal turnovers more quickly in midfield compared to City which is more oriented around defensive players (massive simplification).
City’s game-plan in this match probably deserves an article of its own.