I
Control has always been something that has interested me in football because of the many ways of conceptualising the term, in accordance with the many variables present within a game, which frequently produce contradictory outcomes surrounding the term. Jon Mackenzie (unsurprisingly) captures the essence of this well in his piece on hybrid pressing, whereby in a creating the zonal and man dichotomy, the control of space is contrasted with the more proactive approach of man-orientation which seeks to prevent short passing options and thereby gain control of possession more proactively.
Interestingly, there is something paradoxical about proactivity out of possession being linked to a fundamentally reactive form of a defending whereby you are susceptible to positional manipulation by the opponent almost by definition, as they are the primary reference point. One would imagine a control freak, like say Guardiola, would be averse to such a scheme conceptually, because it hands control over positioning to the opponent. And this is where the term control becomes tricky. Control of the ball could be seen as the best way to control a game more holistically, and attaining the ball often requires a degree of proactivity, and hence the requirement, or more so the incentive to encourage greater degrees of man-orientation to place more pressure on the ball and potential short receivers – which in a way grants positional control to the opponent.
Because of its link to high pressing, reduced risk of minute dynamic advantages being dangerous and the increased spatial scope of deeper play (difficult to focus on compactness and maintain pressure without offside), man-orientation from the opposition in the strictest sense typically occurs when the opponent is building up, and additionally from more consolidated game states. These are generally goal kicks, or where after a failed progression attempt, the team possessing the ball seeks to reset play to allow for the regaining of shape, building backwards to establish a numerical superiority.
Because of this launching pad dynamic, a paradigm arises where controlling entry into the 2nd and 3rd lines, which are the most vertically stretched areas of the pitch becomes crucial. From there, less controlled transitional moments can occur, as rather than seek to generate space, teams seek to attack it dynamically, thus accounting for the unpredictability of duels and the often-desired unpredictable movements created by tight interplay.
II
This type of play is commonly associated with traditional Italian coaching methodology. The rewinding of the play to generate consolidated game-states, typically oriented around accessing the space in between the 2nd and 3rd lines directly to attack the last line being something seen more frequently in Serie A. These routes of entry are moreover predictable because the opposition in contrast to other leagues orients themselves around the players more frequently.
The response of man-orientation makes sense and could be perceived as a chicken or egg scenario, as when attempting to generate turnover deep against more static attacking blocks, there is often enough time to set-up man-to-man to block safe passes to feet and attempt to intercept or duel to provoke a dangerous turnover. In this regard a higher variance approach is preferred which trusts individual defenders in their battles to create transitional opportunities. This is where the concepts of variance and legibility should be individuated, as frequently they are in contradiction. Man-marking, for example, is a very legible approach in that it is easy to understand and observe. However, it is perhaps higher variance in that it leaves a lot of space uncovered and can be quick to cascade into a series of covering mechanisms to account for the lost duel. In these situations, a high-risk, high-reward attitude is embraced, in many ways because of the legibility, rather than the reverse.
The other example to highlight this concept I frequently like to point towards is the ideological difference between somebody like Simone Inzaghi and Pep Guardiola. The former will use a 15-pass rule of sorts to establish the launching pad, but this fundamentally is oriented towards vertical transitions, seeking to play the ball into the feet of attackers centrally in stretched conditions to create up-back through opportunities to attack the last-line. In this conceptualisation, the moment to be isolated when considering the quicker the ball goes forward, the quicker it comes back heuristic is where dynamism was introduced through playing in between the lines. This creates more of distinction between that and the antecedent play as the static game state is sought. Contrasted to Lillo/Pep ideology which is oriented around transition protection, gradual ball progression and the pinning of opponents to limit potential transitions. Conversely, the resetting of play seeks to bait an opponent high, encourage duelling-based approaches (high variance) to vertically transition into the space where 3v3’s or 4v4’s in higher areas can occur. Guardiola contrastingly is more inclined to want to establish control through limiting transition potential, which means establishing base possession in higher regions, progressing through wider areas and crucially, not forcing verticality through circuitry which seeks to play off of small dynamic superiorities when it comes to breaking into space, but rather trying to find the free man, established through more broad, less legible (contrasted to circuit-play), principles.
I would argue for the traditional Italian, legibility is the key concern because of the more circuit-based footballing culture – understanding abstractly what is occurring and being able to plan for set-play’s is the structural concern as opposed to limiting the potentialities which occur after the structured routines. The coaches want to create an environment predictable enough for automatisms to occur, while correspondingly, the opposition want to prevent them and force errors through going man-to-man, a very legible marking scheme where responsibilities are simple, and clear.
To try and make the dichotomy clearer: A legible sequence would be CB passes to FB, a winger fakes a run deep to drag a defender, while the near-side forward drops (in between the 2nd and 3rd lines) and plays a sweeping ball to the winger who has made a double movement and exploits the dynamic superiority conferred via automatisms and having the initiative. These steps along the way could be considered high variance, especially the last pass – which breaks beyond the defence and from there it becomes a more traditional attacking space scenario – but it is cookie-cutter, understandable and can be prepared against a set-defence. A lower variance approach would likely be more against attempting to force these artificial transitions and rather use a positional stucture to pin the opposition, with runs in behind being underlaps from midfielders for example which more securely establish territory. Thus, the former can be more considered more akin to Serie A, and for the point of this post, more paradigmatic of the new era.
III
This potentially generates the question of why teams from Serie A disproportionally man-mark when the leagues equilibrium has formed around deep build-up play and predictability, which man-marking feeds into. And its partially as an attempt to limit, or at least punish that through moving into a stucture which force back to goal reception to compact the pitch and engage with the receiver instantly to generate high turnovers against a stretched shape. Take de Zerbi for example: he has a now famous quote suggesting that going long is gambling, and hence, going man-for-man and attempting prevent goalkeeper short distribution by having all potential options in close proximity helps you limit the opponent’s control on the game and regain possession for yourself. And while there are counterarguments to suggest building around 2nd balls, flick-ons and so forth can be controlled, and that football inherently is risky because of the complexity present by the unpredictability of individual actions in tighter spaces – this line of reasoning which seeks to embrace concepts of comparative risk and maximising advantages in uncertainty lacks the intellectual theory of mind to fully understand de Zerbi’s conception of risk and control which pertains less to variance and more to legibility. The 2nd ball crew typically focus on maximising variance to your advantage to produce net positive situations (the empirical truth is irrelevant here contrasted to perceived truth) rather than perceiving gambling to be inherent in the illegibility of the unfolding process. Building short can typically be better conceptualised in the abstract, with set instructions contrasted to longer build-up which seeks to incorporate and harness the bounce of the ball. All this is to suggest that a game-model, or ideology which views legibility and control as nonpareil in building a sustainable way of playing theoretically also perceives the preventing of the opposition from doing as such makes sense for wanting to maximise long-term chances of success.
A common question I used to ask myself was why teams press Antonio Conte sides high when they have patterns built around their press which are built on dynamic advantages conferred to the team in possession, through elements like initiative. Part of this was predicated on failing to fully understand the difficulties associated with game-to-game variation in approaches which means going from a man-oriented stucture to a more passive mid-block which is more zonal in orientation is not something that can successfully occur in a week. And with this in mind, if you are wanting to build a control-oriented side, which forces teams long, you are likely going to focus on long-term outcomes. This then means that the difficulties associated with quick wholescale changes to adapt to an expert opponent who has a greater proficiency in building short, than you do pressing high can be advantageous even if short-term harmful when assuming full familiarity as both alteration and going with the current plan leave you behind, but the latter allows for consolidation of gains for different situations and can force more uncomfortability, as you are forcing your style more. This rain-or-shineism which requires full conviction and belief in your approach, even if microcosmically flawed, but macrocosmically advantageous provided the assumptions on which your beliefs are built is solid is something I can get behind. It potentially requires (over)confidence, and is oriented around becoming an outlier, rather than seeking to hedge – but much like how I conceptualise deep blocks – understandable for 10-15 minutes to reduce variance and hold a good result – the projection of that in the long-run is likely to be more negative, because seldom is it oriented towards something grander.
I would argue Serie A is renowned for its lower tempo in contrast to other leagues because of the prevalence of the man-to-man paradigm, with this now becoming more common in the Premier League for control-oriented coaches. As while, the ideology of legibility is less pertinent, the outcome is similar, because your Arteta’s and Guardiola’s of the world want a similar outcome of limiting the opponent’s control, and thus forcing them longer.
IV
When a team is pressing man-to-man, gaining small dynamic edges is key, and thus timing of movements and when the ball is released become paramount. Delaying maximally to entice them forward to maximise the space ahead and the subsequently seeking to generate more initiative personally as the defending player must then reconfigure and compact around the pass is important to creating spaces to exploit. It allows a safety option to be better created, in addition to more directly advantageous opportunity as space is larger and when it comes to future passing options. The dynamic element of always being a step ahead of the opponent and using that advantage to maximise time and space is vital. This makes body orientation to receive short passes and maximize the number of options crucial, while processing quickly the opponent’s response to use that slight dynamic edge to open space and exploit the lack of spatial coverage typically associated with man-oriented schemes, which prioritise limiting time and space in and around the ball, with an emphasis on to-feet, back-to-goal reception.
Cowill here exhibits this aspect well, with the stop to gain control and kill the momentum of the ball. Consequently, he moves it forward after enticing Ødegaard, when then has to compact around Groß. From there, Cowill drops and widens progressively to open the angle for the wide pass, theoretically available due to the narrow positioning of the full backs. Cowill being left-footed here is massive in opening the progressive potential of opportunities such as that, as while the inside pass suits a right-footer, that is the simpler element, contrasted to the pertinence of playing a crisp pass forward which better suites reception into the space (centrally). That does not occur here – but the spatial dynamics attempting to be fostered are clear.
The space in between the 2nd and 3rd lines in these man-oriented configurations is the magic zone because centre backs are typically more limited in the extent they can follow as space in behind is more valuable. This typically means, rather than having the ability to always stay tight, they need to prioritise more anticipatory jumps and remaining low as to have multi-directional flexibility. Milan Škriniar is the exemplar when it comes to balancing this defensive responsibility and maintaining flexibility.
This dynamic played out interestingly with Cowill pushing high on Ødegaard.
Rather than being some cosmic masterplan of reversing the John stones, this is just an extension of man-oriented principles. Typically, for teams such as Antonio Conte’s, the reference point is for when to leave the dropping player is when they enter the next line – for example, for a centre back that is when the player they are responsible for moves deeper than the 2nd line of the press – with this type of principle being flexible to varying levels of compactness which come with different types of pressing. Exceptions based on skills of players also feature for Conte, such as Cuti Romero typically being given more license to aggressively track
Arsenal’s spacing here is a tad more ambiguous, because in the scheme, Ødegaard functions as a forward player, hence Cowill’s responsibility for him. But the potential to drop (very) deep can leave a lot of space exposed in dangerous regions.
De Zerbi has previously referenced this game of cat and mouse. The ultimate question becomes: Who will commit more? De Zerbi states that if the opponent is marking man-to-man, going long is the correct option. This is firstly because building out becomes too precarious, while the advantage of exposed higher space to generate transitional moments has been achieved. You have moved the opponent via deeper commitment. Typically, his teams seek to pass it to the goalkeeper as the free man in these situations to progress play higher to better access the higher attackers, in addition to their centrality stretching the last line of defence. This method of attacking is something I used to call the Consigli-Boga – as the passive man-oriented block, undermined by the goalkeepers +1 allows them to progress and find a searching ball to the opponents in-behind winger. That is not to say the tactic is isolated to de Zerbi – for example, 3:00 mins through this video – Magic Mike to Rafa Leao.
Leao Show | Every Goal and Assist | Highlights Of the Season | Serie A 2021/22 - YouTube
A clear example of this occurs here, Ødegaard, aware of the man-oriented dynamic drops very deep as Ramsdale launches it forward – with the outcome being a contested duel in a lot of space with numerical parity.
This in a way can be conceptualised positively for the attacking team as it is a high-variance moment created from deep, but from another perspective it has forced them into a more uncomfortable game and relinquished their potential for control. I’ve mentioned previously why its this reason I think Pep is not disingenuous when he goes over the top in his appraisal of teams coached for instance by Marcelo Bielsa or other managers associated with more rain-or-shineism openness. Lest I make another shallow and unhelpful reference between chess and football – the concept of putting somebody outside their comfort zone, even if game-theoretically sub-optimal is one to consider when playing against actors who are not omniscient and perfect. When my opponent in chess plays the Scandinavian defence for example, I am often flummoxed and annoyed because they are taking me into terrain with which I am uncomfortable and they thrive, creating a more idiosyncratic game in conditions they are better accustomed, and where reaction, rather than predetermination and familiarity dictate my moves. Through this analogy, one can imagine that Pep is not disingenuous after beating a minnow 6-1 and saying they are so, so good and so, so challenging, because they defended proactively. Defending proactively is challenging for City because it provides them different things to consider and often introduces more variance. The opponent is attempting to gain control, which is City’s thing. I believe Pep would often rather face a deep block where they can establish a consolidated rest-defence and where the game is more legible and oriented around sustaining pressure, even if the result is 2-0. It prevents the establishment of a game-state oriented around City being camped outside the opponent’s box and which becomes more oriented around the vicissitudes of verticality. These situations are generally higher variance, even if that variance benefits City, which reduces the extent to which they, and he himself controls the game, as it becomes more oriented around preparing the players for spontaneous situations and attempting to generate advantageous, but nevertheless variable outcomes contrasted to the cookie-cutter – winger receives, midfielder underlaps, back pass towards the inverted full back, who then crosses it in, which was seen frequently in the 21/22 season.
This season they have adapted to better play around the vicissitudes of verticality, and often seek to build deeper to Ederson more often to produce these moments, contrasted with the previous seasons orientation around pinning the opponent high and attempting to suffocate them with sustained pressure. The team is now better suited to duels, transitional play and going longer in controlled manners which has certainly benefitted them. I think results-based analysis would indicate the gulf in quality between City 21/22 and 22/23 is larger than it is, with my preference still being towards 21/22. But I think it is accepted generally they are better prepared around uncomfortable situations where they cannot dominate because of the oppositions defensive approach and have sought to rectify a weakness (a relative one, they were still better than 99% of teams in those situations). And because of the aforementioned rain-or-shineism, they have prepared around that all season, even if that hurt early on, for long-term benefits, which was certainly risky given the early season issues. This adaption in large part is creating a man-to-man paradigm, and the consequence has been Manchester City becoming more antifragile, meaning they gain from volatility to a better extent which perhaps places them in better stead in the more volatile environment of cup competitions.
V
Against Manchester City, Jan Paul van Hecke adopted a role similar to Cowill on Odegaard, the centre back stepping forward to compensate for numerical inferiority in midfield – the orientation is fundamentally man-to-man, hence Caicedo’s deeper positioning on de Bruyne. This approach makes sense in a man-to-man scheme against high and wide wingers because the full backs will rarely get pulled deep, leaving the centre back exposed 1v1. Meaning the defence functions somewhat as a an auxiliary back three.
There are two things I want to note about this picture:
First are the pre-emptive stances of Gilmour and van Hecke, attempting to maintain flexibility while being prepared to jump if required. The role played by van Hecke is intensive because when the ball is launched and Brighton seek to reconsolidate he must put in the hard yards to become the stretching centre back. This captures the man-oriented paradigm well: desiring consolidated, predictable game states which require proper positioning from players. These predictable game-states are deep to stretch space and ensure the numerical superiority, whilst moreover being oriented around goalkeeper possession as a response to the opponent’s man-orientation.
Second is the roaming role of de Bruyne which is not characteristic of City prior to 22/23 – this can upset man-oriented configurations more because there is more horizontal fluidity than is typically associated with positional sides. This, like many things City 22/23 is the Haaland effect, as rather than having two forwards capable of dropping deep to support play occupying the respective half-spaces, Haaland is given more freedom to stay forward, and thus de Bruyne has more freedom and responsibility to roam between the lines to find pockets to receive. This can upset more man-oriented schemes, where the predictability of positionality allows for clearer matchups, with vertical rotations typically being simpler to deal with because it operates on a more limited plain. This is not to suggest relational positional freedom is the antidote to man-orientation, as more compact spacing and less emphasis on establishing connections across the pitch to stretch it can allow for easier compensation for numerical inferiorities, for example. This example in microcosm provides a good example of the potential utility of having a ‘freer’ roaming player within the team, although additionally, without being overly centrist, every style has a downside; (I prefer in the abstract two more positional dropping forwards a la Brighton – but the also think the KDB/Haaland dynamic justifies alteration from abstract preferences), the positional holes in transition are visible, neutering the efficacy of any transition – as the players are less connected, and thus easier to defend, particularly as there is a large central void – with the positional right half-space overload to isolate, charge into space ahead with touchline winger creating a 2v1 transition being trademark KDB.
VI
In accordance with the de Zerbian doctrine regarding the cat and mouse game, if the opponent insist on numerical parity with outfield players, you use the goalkeeper as a launching pad towards more direct wing attacks to exploit the space left in behind through the man-oriented tracking – embracing a more gambling, transitional style, because the aim of upsetting the opponents spatial coverage is successful, and you have moved the opponent, through moving yourself, juxtaposed to the traditional positional play maxim of moving the ball to move the opponent.
City: however, with their defence now full of proper defenders probably fancy their chances from these situations making more rigid man-orientation in contrast to a more intense ball-oriented system which seeks to produce inaccuracy but leaves more space to play through for a precise team more viable – and potentially more control oriented despite the increased role of duelling – because they are now built to dominate duels. Generally, an argument could suggest a man-oriented system leaves you susceptible to inevitable individual errors - like van Hecke lunging in overzealously on Haaland and getting done by a double movement – and therefore mistakes made should be factored as a systemic problem hedged against individual quality when defending.
This is an interesting facet to consider, as the postionist paradigm makes specialisation more appealing beyond a base technical level. This is in contrast to previous rhetoric regarding growing universality, with total ‘footballers’ being prioritised, in addition to those who can find unique solutions in a multitude of situations. Of course, all of Manchester City’s players are technically excellent, but that as the priority seems to be decreasing with regards to functions all around the pitch with the departures of notably technical players in Cancelo, Zinchenko and Jesus to be replaced with more specialist profiles in their respective positions with the ascendancy of Ake, Akanji and Haaland. When the space of operations is limited, so too is the skillset required. 21/22, Foden, Jesus and Bernardo false 9 required a universal skillset capable of receiving at all angles as they roamed across the pitch, magnetically attracted to the ball to provide a +1 around pressure. A certain level of comfortability around pressure is still desired; however, it is telling that Bernardo has become decreasingly used as a pivot member (in addition to his absence upfront) – the reasoning is largely due to defensive pressing reasons in contrast to Mahrez who does not carry the same off ball intensity. However, Bernardo’s ability to float, intelligently connect, and through his nous and risk aversion be a mini-Pep on the pitch was invaluable in establishing control last season. But now, the role is more simplified. For all the raving around John Stones, who has admirably played higher, he is not Bernardo with regards to complexity in possession. However, in a more specialised paradigm, that is fine, because in possession he is suitably safe and comfortable in the areas of the pitch he operates – the off-ball benefits of additional security from longer balls through physicality is worth more now than Bernardo’s ethereal press evasion (This is not to denigrate Stones – a player I love – but to emphasise he is simply not Bernardo – one of the best ball retainers around). This City team is less about fluidity and adaptation in tight spaces (they were still hyper-specialised in 21/22 – think Cancelo back-post cross to Jesus, but in way where all-rounders were more required for the roles played as they built around technical excellence – which they still have, but they have alleviated issues with transitional physicality rather than being super-hyper specialised on the ball), and more around dominating games generally as per before, but with the additional specialisation around transitional circumstances with more attacking and defensive (in particular) specialists.
When you can win the long-ball, man-orientating to force the long ball makes sense. Dominating the air and 2nd balls is part of dominating the game, and makes City are more impervious force. They are basically saying to Steele – progress and try the long-ball, see what happens. They kill short distribution opportunities then proceed to dominate the direct game. This is perhaps a luxury afforded to City and elite teams, as other teams must consider trade-offs between skillsets rather than being capable of getting all-rounders.
This somewhat contradicts my previous sentiment so I should clarify – City do face trade-offs and decided to make them to be more physically imposing and specialised this season – it is just the category of bad does not really exist for them. But then again, these things are all relative and adjusted to expectations accordingly, which makes this overarching sentiment quite reductive. Pep was courageous and went down a different direction after a Champions League season essentially decided by contingency factors (Real Madrid was a freak, Fernandinho was RB etc.,). It made them better suited to bigger games long term through eliminating the variance of being slightly susceptible in transition. Thus, they are still the best technically, but worse, which is often not considered because they remain the best which means the trade-off can be framed disingenuously. The problem I was referring to overall was the decision teams like Brighton may have to make, where to get a proven technically accomplished centre back, they will need to make notable trade-offs which create more overt vulnerabilities (or maintain super scouting which allows them to circumvent financial disparities). But that is why we expect different results from City and Brighton.
The theory therefore is: City can dominate duels defensively with their new set-up and alterations to personnel, allowing man-to-man to be a prudent strategy as it prevents short distribution, granting control while minimising risk. In attack, the addition of Haaland provides them more of an outlet for direct play, combined with Ederson’s pinpoint long distribution. He is not a ‘target man’ but provides more of a physical presence to build off. Grealish/Mahrez/Bernardo lack the direct in behind threat to frequently try direct balls in behind, contrasted to a player like Sterling. Foden seems to be the ideal midpoint between these two profiles, having the acceleration and more direct intent to threaten in behind, while his masterful control of the ball means he can be a high-touch consolidator.
VII
Interestingly, Shakhtar under de Zerbi were much less inclined to use stretched spatial conditions and goalkeeper possession as a means of progression, but rather attempted to hold possession with the centre backs more frequently and play in more condensed spaces around the half-way line.
The reasons for this a multitudinous and conjectural – I suspect part of it was the team having the highest small-space technical ceiling in contrast to Sassuolo and Brighton. This meant building more around allowing players to thrive in tight areas, and more effectively transition from higher areas after a player like Solomon or Tete wriggle out of space, or Marcos Antonio somehow breaks lines as the opponents swarm around him. Part of the trade-off typically associated with this type of ability (they are correlated because of how height generally effects fludity/agility but even given no correlation, the level de Zerbi works at forces a trade-off, as the physically robust and technically excellent players eventually get poached by the elite), is reduced physicality, which means playing over large spaces is less advantageous as they are unable to fully exploit the space created, allowing the opponent to regroup, making them more vulnerable in transition should a turnover occur. Said turnover is potentially more likely to occur as well as in larger spaces the game becomes more physical overall, less socio-affective and, predicated around using short connections in tight spaces and the disguise offered by multiple short passing options. The players are less capable of holding their own and buying time for support or striding past a player. Time is another important element as at Shakhtar the opponents faced in the Ukrainian league would simply not press the best team in the league technically high, meaning prioritising less transitional moments became crucial and thus a strength earlier in contrast to expectations at Sassuolo and Brighton, where one would suspect the opponent to consider the teams more even, and thus be more inclined to pursue their typical game-plan, which often features higher pressing and responding to opposition deep possession. Additional reasons include the starting wingers being comfortable in interiour zones, probably more so than out wide in areas outside the final third, while having an overlapping full back in Dodo. Shakhtar essentially was different tactically because of the skillset of the players and the context of the team. It would have been interesting to see the team develop and morph into something more complete.
But generally, as it relates to the man-to-man paradigm, Shakhtar used goalkeeper possession less because they were less comfortable competing for second balls and playing longer after enticing the opponent into a game of cat and mouse, and preferred rather to create space through condensing the pitch, linking and breaking from more advanced positions. This made them more ’4-1-5’ than 4-2-4’. For this reason, they were the most structured, with the most set-rotations to balance the team as it transitioned between deeper phases, and to make breakthroughs in more condensed areas. It was less reliant on finding the players in between the 2nd and 3rd lines who would reliably be accessible and isolated as in deeper phases, but more about creating access to that space higher by having a midfielder drift to be the ‘full back’ have the full back push forward and the winger then come inside, with timing being crucial to find that pass and use the dynamic superiority that way. Overall, it was more systemised in its functioning in an odd way, because the backpass to the goalkeeper to reset was a less desirable outcome as an out failed riskier players, or as an area of high control possession where picking a pass based on semi-spontaneous movement was more possible.
VIII
In summation, the man-to-man paradigm arising is largely as a consequence of teams becoming extremely proficient at playing out of pressure, and players generally becoming more composed in possession, due to the emergence of coaches such as de Zerbi who emphasis time, generated by a fearless composure as a crucial aspect. As Guillaume explores, timing is something becoming increasingly important, and in many ways (emphasis mine) is related to the increased importance of legibility in schemes with set-routines. Within this, allowing a free man to be present can often lead to the team being played through, as the possession team maximise thier dynamic advantages. Additionally, in more intense pressing environments (more ball-oriented) which generate more complexity, having the capacity to react to alterations, through these controlled measures (think de Zerbian S and the complexities entailed - what happens beyond - bounce pass in the direction of pressure, forward to the midfielder, turn individually etc.,) knowing what and when to apply, and being in synchronicity becomes more important. Intensity generally increases variance and decreases legibility. From this even more emphasis on the players as reactors, rather than actors playing out the managers playbook. However, within this are emerging teams who are happy to engage in the game of cat and mouse defensively ,and fully commit to man-orientation or thereabouts in waiting to press the goalkeeper until they advance, keeping the game dead and thus acting against these permutations. This is interesting because it grants them control by preventing short distribution rather than attempting to bait short then force inaccuracy, forcing what may abstractly seem like good conditions to go long, but which are killed by having duelling specialists. What also must be considered within this, is the type of forward associated with these deep build-up teams, a more false 9 type, oriented around playing around rather than over pressure.
Whether going man-to-man is prudent is generally predicated on whether you trust your teams ability to win the cat and mouse because leaving the goalkeeper generally permits an accurate longer ball. This is achieved through being more comfortable in high variance scenarios and duelling conditions. Also worth considering is the control aspect, and whether encouraging these higher variance occurrences, even if difficult to defend is worth it to force the opponent long and thus hold possession more often, and potentially take them out of their comfort zone. I guess a thinking point here is the importance of defensive specialists as it relates to this - both ground and aerially to dominate the space in between the 2nd and 3rd lines and allow man-to-man to be effectively established and thereby prevent shorter methods of progressing without taking disproportionate risks. It would be odd to think, 10 years ago that having solid defenders and going man-to-man would be perceived as progressive, and while I generally oppose the teleological narrative surrounding the cyclical nature of football, it is at least somewhat attested to here.
On a personal note, I like man-to-man because of the football it produces and the associated attitudes of the respective sides - in having full confidence in the players and thier system, while attempting to make the opponent uncomfortable. I like the slower pace of football, predicated on more timed breaks and team synchronicity combined with the socio-affective play emphasised in between the lines. For most teams I imagine a more hybrid approach is optimal, but I am a victim in preferring my own cultural football preference, come rain or shine.
Interesting read. For me the comparison here that draws interest is between Stones and Cancelo. In Pep's 3-2-2-3 system from 20/21 (structurally similar to the shift with Stones in midfield), the different roles of the 9 and Ws are immediately obvious. What would interest me, if you had any insight, is just how differently the two interpreted the role. Obviously Cancelo's press resistance and creativity contributes to that more 'hyper-specialised possession profile' but I wonder (with a view to this season) if Cancelo could have played in that role and if all the changes that cascaded from Haaland's presence mean he can no longer be the finalizer he was in years gone by (à la Jesus backpost cross or left sided overload breakthroughs v back 5s like in 21/22)