The logic operating behind the traditional ‘vertical’ false 9 is that if you drop deep in possession and are followed, you create an exploitable gap in the oppositions defensive line, which owing to the dynamic superiority conferred onto the possession team, can be exploited by a winger or midfielder running into space, often anticipatorily through automatisms or more abstract practice of 3rd man runs. Conversely, should the opposition leave you, you can receive in between the lines unperturbed, creating the opportunity to run at the last line of the oppositions defence. Moreover, the two are not mutually exclusive as should you have the dynamic and or qualitative superiority on the opposing tracker, you can lose them through fluidly turning them, or moving into space more laterally between the open lines to lose them, and then directly access space to dribble into, or find the pass in behind.
I would argue however that the first reasoning functions under a man-oriented whilst the defence is operating within their own half paradigm which does not exist predominately anymore (at least at the elite levels), whilst the reception in between the lines has been nullified by increasingly compact block which destroy any chance for consistent vertical reception in central spaces.
However, within more transitional circumstances such as those created by higher pressing, man-orientation to cover for vertical space naturally created by pushing the opponent to the extents of the pitch whilst necessarily maintaining half-way line coverage permits the classical reasoning to continue. Functionally, this is less directly dangerous due to the distance from goal allowing for greater recovery times, particularly with most pressing being out-to-in, closing central spaces and showing play out wide, whilst potential tactical fouls are less likely to be penalised with a yellow, allowing for the endemicity of tight marking over physicality against fluid dribbler profiles.
Nevertheless, as a mechanism of maintaining a degree of control during build-up, having profiles capable of escaping tight pressure after receiving in space to access often the underloaded far-side and nullify opposing pressing efforts is pertinent to maintaining an overall degree of control through permitting short build-up, whilst hedging against the Vicissitudes of Verticality through more consistently winning duels.
However, as discussed here (Encroachment) to deal with increased vertical spaces, I see more teams adopting Liverpool’s approach of maintain a compact high block which prevents direct infiltration in between the lines, allowing the opponent free reception on their first line, whilst using potential weak or wall passes as a trigger to gradually increase vertical coverage before pouncing at the optimal moment, pistioning play deeper or to wide areas and applying enough pressure on the ball at that moment to prevent exploration of now open vertical spaces. A much more controlled approach than the traditional direct man-orientation (which Liverpool use centrally through direct tracking of the opponents’ deeper midfielders, with the forced wall passes from these scenarios often being the trigger to engage more intensely).
This arguably makes the profile less important in transitional circumstances where they have been most pertinent to the ‘modern game’. However, I would argue this is only the case in vertical spaces, with the rise of the horizontal false 9 being more important in providing ball-sided overloads to connect the two sides of the pitch through moving around the opponent’s central compactness and exploiting a more zonal approach.
They still primarily position themselves in between the 2nd and 3rd lines of the opposition defence, meaning space is tight; however, that is why there is an increasing importance in their ability to thrive in tight settings rather than abandonment of the idea because of forced opposition difficulty. Directly, they are going to be less effective compared to the previous ‘vertical’ iteration; however, I only call the vertical iteration as such because they existed in a paradigm where space in between the 2nd and 3rd lines could be more easily accessed. This has potentially lowered the amount of players capable of playing the role, or more so changed the importance of particular skill sets, as tight dribbling, close control, acceleration, agility become more important to evade compactness rather than the capacity to directly expose an opposition line through a pass in behind.
Nevertheless, overly future projecting is potentially dangerous, because if you prioritise small space ability above all else, you lose potential gains over teams which don’t convert to high compact block, or that perhaps are more willing to move to a deeper block earlier from their mid-block, allowing the drifting forward to find space on the edge of the box on the half-space to directly cause a threat.
This is why I think profile variability has been key to City this season, and masking their lack of direct central threat, as they have an attacking arsenal capable of adapting around the respective strengths of particular opponents. Against the more classical Club Brugge, you can fully exploit all the wonderous benefits typically associated with the false 9 through playing Phil Foden centrally. Against Liverpool in the first instance where overloading the left-side was important, playing Jack Grealish there because of his comfortability in that region made sense, because that would be predominately occupied, with this allowing Phil Foden to use his greater dynamism and explosivity to expose James Milner. Against Liverpool on the second occasion, playing against the high compact block, you can select the profiles which seek to run in behind the defence to exploit time allowed in possession. Whereas against teams who you anticipate defending deeper with an emphasis on central compactness, the more flexible profile of Bernardo Silva who embodies attacking universality and is capable at receiving at practically all angles fluidly is better suited, allowing for fluid interchanges with a more traditional touchline inverted winger in Mahrez, while permitting Foden on the flank and creating a space for the infiltratory movement of Gündoğan. Conversely, perhaps if you’re looking to break the last line directly down the flanks, Gabriel Jesus is better suited to being the forward because of his off-ball movement making him the ideal player to lurk centrally. In essence, having so many options which can be specially selected to suite the opposition while the overall playstyle remains intact has been extraordinarily useful for Manchester City this season.
This then generated the question which provoked this post – why would Manchester City then commit themselves to a centre forward profile in Haaland, How to Make your Strikers Play Like Erling Haaland, Part Two | SOCCERDETAIL (read this for more detail) – summarised for the sake of this article (abstract representation of a profile), Haaland is a technically capable player in tight spaces, but his strengths lie in his pace for someone of his statue combined with the a rabid appetite for goals. Working from this, it can be surmised that he would fit well when needing to break the last line of defence, such as against a high compact block, offering more profile diversity in his greater ability to hold up play, whilst still possessing the pace and direct dribbling threats of his counterparts. Against deeper blocks he potentially lacks the horizontal adaptability which would allow him to link play and generate wide overloads; however, with Haaland’s inclusion, we can deduce one fewer attacking slot being regularly available, potentially resulting in Foden playing more frequently on the wings, whilst Gündoğan drops down the hierarchy as his infiltratory movement because relatively less valuable, meaning there is likely to be one of Foden or Bernardo on each flank respectively to compensate horizontally. Fluidity of play is reduced; however, against teams which prioritise compactness in between the 2nd and 3rd lines, a centre forwards link-up play in direct terms is often nullified with the positional role of occupying defenders and making stretching runs being more important which Haaland is capable of meaning, the increase in direct threat makes the trade off worth it. Altough I am wary of stretching runs as a homogenous term, with the tight, quick agile directional changes of Foden being difficult to replicate for a player of Haaland’s stature (despite his relatively superiority on others of the profile).
The worry my come in deeper build-up because as the brilliant Martín Grosman highlights his main weaknesses to be passing and less agile movements which impact close control. This makes him more a liability in build-up, and reduces the potential for him to drop deep, support play whilst dragging a marker, as physically he is better suited to traditional hold-up play, whilst this nevertheless is not his forte making his involvement in more transitional games seem dubious. However, the transitional threat he provides once the space has been created by playing through pressure makes him extremely valuable, potentially amplifying overall value, even if the number of transitions created is reduced. Considering this issue more abstractly, City are potentially an outlier, insofar as they rarely face high pressure because of the fear they strike into the hearts of opposition making them more inclined to take a less forcing approach. Thus, this ‘weakness’ is perhaps less worrisome for City compared to other possession teams looking for an analogous profile, or potentially analogous relative abstract quality which despite stylistic similarities in approach to City in given circumstances, are forced to face said circumstances more frequently because of oppositional responses.
Thus, in a less convenient world, such as that of de Zerbi’s Shakhtar in the Champions League – could this profile work. Lassina Traoré is very different to Haaland which makes direct comparisons difficult; however, from a build-up perspective, the 4-2-4 permits two forwards to occupy the half-spaces, thus skill-set variability between the two forwards, one oriented around dropping deep to gain the dynamic superiority on the defender whilst the other possesses a direct threat in behind akin to a more typical centre forward whilst having the frame to link-up play when build-up occurs down their flank allows for differential modes of build-up down either flanks. Because these are transitional circumstances under tight marking in larger spaces, rotations occur frequently, but they are not of the type requiring elite technical proficiency in the advanced half-spaces such as those which occur deeper in the opposition’s half, reducing the detrimental effect a ‘less’ able profile would have. This is moreover potentially complementary in an overload to isolate model where pressure is escaped via use of the fluid player, lack of deeper half-space occupation (due to say opposition anticipating this movement and pre-emptively cutting passing lanes) allows the forward to act as a bounce pass before the transition to turn and run in behind. Essentially, to act as a wall passing option which pins defenders, technical execution is perhaps not too important in the hierarchy of skills needed to perform the role, which requires involvement in the deeper and more advanced line-breaking roles. A physical forward, who is quick is already extremely valuable, whilst for the reasons highlighted by Martin, these strengths are likely to act to the detriment of their abilities in tight spaces. Thus, adding the technical maestro tag to their repertoire would only further amplify value in addition to rarity, meaning sacrifice is needed (A paradigm emphasised by, if I interpret him correctly, Luke). To an amplified extent, this is what I imagine clubs are having to consider with Darwin Núñez should I believe the characterisations heard, whilst Dušan Vlahović and Haaland represent less amplified perspectives – but still limited in comparison to the fluidity provided by having Bernardo or Foden up front. Essentially, can you justify having less fluid transitions, potentially automatising to a greater extent to cover for technical inadaptability in between the lines whilst potentially having worse combination play in the final third in these similarly more spontaneous and tight space circumstances to have better output in front of goal (I plan on writing how this applies to de Zerbi directly at some point hopefully)? When seeking to ignite a transition through overloading play in a particular area, creating space elsewhere the essential element of ‘positional play’ being unphased by time constraints and pressure through elegance acts to maximise your time and space while allowing an easier following of runs through grace (artsy language perhaps overly inspired by a love for Phil Foden). In the words of Johan Cruyff, a good player that requires too much time can suddenly be a bad player – how can you adapt around a player with relatively higher time constraints when a system has been built around the masters in succeeding in low time situations in Foden and Bernardo.
Overall, I do not think this is a question that can be answered directly in the abstract. I’ve attempted to outline the three crucial modes, with the latter in the transitional form being the most pertinent because it is the most challenging and poses the highest risk/reward ratio microcosmically, making maximisation in that area critical. What I would say is that the striker needs to be capable of raising the teams goal scoring potential against either high compact blocks, or mid-to-low blocks considerably whilst traditional hold-up play in combination with their physicality would allow for different types of more up-back transitional routines to occur, which while I may argue are less adaptable, can be made up for through qualitative superiority à la Lukaku at Inter. In contexts where the classical mode of false 9 as outlined earlier can still thrive, I would opt heavily towards biasing preference towards fluid dribbly types because they are best suited to exploit the space in between the lines through conducting actions supplely and sinuously to best exploit the transitional circumstances. How Manchester City adapt as a team should they sign Haaland is interesting, whether the output and increased transitional threat once in action compensate for reduced fluidity is unknowable until he signs. Would I recommend it – I would have to watch more Haaland. However, deviating from their formula currently would certainly require a high bar – which given the aforementioned paradigm City face where transitional quality is potentially less important speaks to me overall preference – although City do need more horizontal fluidity which requires even greater skills in tight spaces, if in reduced risks circumstances. Ultimately, I hope I’ve at least outlined considerations, if not given particular weightings, because at the moment, I am unsure leaning towards preferring less traditional forwards, although being more open to their inclusion than I have in the past.
My bias is certainly towards highlighting what City have to lose, because I love them in thier present state so much. In his episode on A Podcast About Tactics Tiago Estêvão highlighted the importance of context - which provoked the thought that experimentation is much easier internally than externally because there are fewer sunk costs. And thus, buying to change is a massive risk if that change is actually detrimental. However, that is potentially a risk you can take when you are at the pinnacle, with the financial muscle and squad strength of Manchester City.