This post will investigate Liverpool’s defensive style of encroachment which seeks to limit direct transitional circumstances until optimal space constrainment has occurred, and Manchester City’s adaptation around this approach with additional caution - slowly using depth to go forwards. The first half largely was an antidote to the Vicissitudes of Verticality approach.
Liverpool played in a high compact block which I would characterise as sitting as high as possible while preventing the game from becoming transitional. When pressing to the oppositions box, you have greater amounts of effective space to cover because the constraining tool of offside is negated by the depth of build-up. Therefore, compactness is harmed, increasing the space in between the lines, particularly the 2nd and 3rd because of the necessity for the backline to cover the most advanced accessible territory. This paradigm of increased vertical distances is what makes playing deep against intense high pressure a worthy risk, because nowhere else on the pitch will so much space be exposed for the (structured) opposition to defend. Thus, Jürgen Klopp’s rationale was to prevent sustained pressure from City by sitting higher, while simultaneously maintaining strong enough compactness to prevent ball progression in between the lines. Because maintaining tight vertical distances was paramount in preventing City from breaking through the lines, the effectiveness of the offside trap became pertinent, particularly as less pressure was applied to the ball in accordance with reduced pitch coverage.
City correspondingly moved to their deep build-up shape against high pressure, a 4-2-4, with Bernardo Silva supporting Rodri in the double pivot. For the reasoning behind that, see here: 4-2-4 <3
However, the summation is that it horizontally stretches the pressing line by allowing the full backs to widen while maintaining a strong central connection to the centre. A single pivot would be overwhelmed and lack options after supporting the ball-side, creating disconnection and thus potential for effective pitch compaction. City by playing deep and using a 4-2-4 therefore sought to stretch Liverpool’s press and create space to progress in between the lines.
Liverpool posed the problem: how will you progress if we sit high, maintain compactness while protecting space in behind with an aggressive offside line – they attempted to make themselves favourites for long-balls in behind, because the distances for the passes were large to allow for a reaction, while the space in behind was far enough from goal, that split-second moments of control while the defender is adapting were negligible in behind. To tangentially build on theory – tiny dynamic superiorities in compact spaces are more pertinent in higher areas because of the threat of direct access to goal, through a shot, or an instantaneous short pass to a nearby player who subsequently threatens a shot. They thus granted themselves covering time and space through sitting high. Liverpool theoretically sought to sit high while covering for the weakness of reduced compactness typically associated with the approach, at the cost of producing turnovers directly – but rather indirectly through controlling the space the ball could progress into, but additionally, not forcing those moments, hence the indirectness.
This vertical compactness moreover meant the outside-to-in accessing of space in between the lines was less of an option because the players receiving lacked space to turn into, although because Liverpool’s midfielders were man-oriented on their corresponding City midfielder, they could match City numerically across the stretched pitch, meaning pressure could moreover be quickly applied to the full backs because depending on depth of play either Henderson would step up and Salah cover, or Salah position himself narrow out-to-in and Henderson shuttle out-wide with Fabinho covering (more common from goal kicks than open play).
A trigger to more conventional high pressing seemed to be the backwards pass from full back to centre-back whilst the team had committed a ball-sided shuttle, with the centre forward (Jota typically) carrying his run onto the goalkeeper to limit time and space, while Fabinho would jump higher on Rodri centralising to allow Liverpool’s far-side midfielder (because of the Bernardo double pivot dynamic, disproportionally Thiago on KDB) which sought to move play from one-side to the other while continually limiting options (having the goalkeeper covered in this equation), preventing any backwards consolidating moves to limit effective space and force a longer ball. From these situations, the ball into the half-space to Gabrial Jesus was typically tried, as is general of 4-2-4 structures which seek that forward dropping into the half-space as the transitional outlet for progression in between the 2nd and 3rd lines. Virgil van Dijk was characteristically imperious, however. This happened on the right because City build down the left, hence the tide of pressure waved them towards Stones, suiting Liverpool who presumably preferred the van Djik on Jesus match-up additionally. An issue was potentially KDB dropping vertical to the centre back, limiting on floor access to Jesus, although upon reflection this is potentially on purpose because Mane looks to intercept the vertical pass with his out-to-in running, meaning a lofted ball is required regardless, allowing the more direct support which draws Liverpool higher to make more sense.
In their higher block therefore, Liverpool sought to prevent time in possession through having Henderson step-up onto Laporte, forming their own 4-2-4 pressing shape with Jota temporarily covering the Bernardo pass, leaving Stones as the free man, for Jota to subsequently apply his own pressure. This seems oriented around Manchester City’s left-sided asymmetry. This approach seeks to gradually encroach, limiting options while pushing play backwards, pouncing on either reduced space, or a technical error to initiate more intensely compared to Manchester City’s more ball-oriented pressing which seeks to limit time and space for the ball carrier instantly to force a long ball. The intention with this high encroaching block is to cut off options in between the lines when moving forward and continually force lateral and backwards passes until there is sufficient proximity between the forwards and deepest possession players (when Ederson is in his own box for example) to effectively limit time and space, to then force a long, uncontrolled ball. Thus, territorial progression is key, because depth was City’s primary pressure alleviation control; however, moving forward as a coordinated block to reduce vertical distances to prevent the centre backs directly progressing was key, while the 4-2-4 defensive shape prevented out-to-in access.
Adding onto this point, Cancelo balls down the flank were potentially viewed as particularly dangerous because how he can manipulate the ball from left-to-right because of ‘weak-sided’ positioning which means the ball trajectory curls into the runners path, a type of pass more difficult on the strong side because the touchline limits space to curl. This is particuarlly pertinent as to achieve space against this Liverpool set-up, positioning has to be very wide, hence negating the danger of a directly vertical ball from full-back to winger because the defender can follow in-to-out, keeping play out wide once progression has been achieved contrasted to the forward carrying his momentum inwards.
City’s response to Liverpool’s set-up was to be less provocatory of the press and rather seek to circulate between the goalkeeper and centre backs while gradually progressing forward as a unit with strong connections which sought to force Liverpool’s block slightly backwards with their respective players. When Henderson stepped out for example, the response was to go instantly back to Ederson rather than use the additional step of the centre back lateral which was discovered to be part of the encroachment strategy to exploit any excess time used to gain territory (from Liverpool’s perspective) – essentially, City cut out the middle man, as their out-to-in progression route via the full backs was cut, meaning Ederson was more directly involved in higher (but still own 3rd) regions.
Liverpool’s man-orientation sought to carry-runs via proximity to prevent the extra-man in the goalkeeper from undermining their approach, and subsequently continue thier run onto on the isolated wide player should the goalkeeper elect not to go long. City thereby minimised this potential by making sure passes to Ederson were controlled rather than under pressure, splitting Liverpool’s pressing line and preventing the in-to-out carrying of runs - speeding up the process, reducing the amount of time Liverpool had to reduce the distances, and increasing the time for them to reconfigure postionally as one fewer step meant one fewer adjustment and more time to dedicate to said adjustment.
Maintaining central coverage and split CB’s was therefore crucial, particularly when building from presses triggered in central areas where potential Liverpool’s discoordination could be better exploited because of the newly introduced space and the isolation of the player pressing the goalkeeper relative to more consolidated circumstances. Such backwards passing – central coverage and split CB’s to spread Liverpool’s press leading to disunity provided Bernardo this passing opportunity to undermine the approach for example.
Another example is here were patient deep circulation before entering Liverpool’s engagement line caused discoordination, particularly as the possession followed a counter attack where positioning is less rigid and therefore typical roles are not being occupied but fluidly filled, as demonstrated by Thiago’s positioning, who interchanges with Jota thereafter to resume initial positioning, but where that period of change facilitated Bernardo’s reception and the deepening of Liverpool’s line. This was part of the sequence preceding Ederson’s near miss; however, the issue stemmed from indecision to exploit the space created later, in addition to an anomalous slip.
Other techniques were used such as exploiting Bernardo’s tight dribbling to provoke the proximity in certain situations, particularly as Liverpool reformed following a failed press (or more so, having not reached the next trigger point – proximity to ball carrier to continue going forward) where he would engage, draw, then go backwards towards a centre back with additional time and space to clip a ball forward.
As the half progressed (before the 2nd goal), Liverpool’s intensity lowered; their line however did not, resulting in circumstances such as these where Bernardo was essentially allowed to pick a pass in behind.
Interestingly, the second time Jesus was attempted to be accessed via the half-space following Liverpool’s continuation of pressure followed a centre-back to centre-back to Ederson deep splitting which allowed Liverpool’s players to carry their runs with intensity whilst the City players moved deeper allowing for encroachment which furthered my inclination towards placing emphasis on the direct back pass because it doesn’t allow two players to jump, as the centre back is able to adjust his positioning should the ball go straight to Ederson, rather than receive laterally, pass it backwards, then readjust. As pictured below – Hendo can only jump because of the additional lateral step. Directly back to Ederson and City can reconsolidate in a controlled manner rather than being forced into a transitional circumstance of space introduction at the back with continual positional readjustments while Liverpool increases the intensity of encroachment.
This approach is not wrong, but rather embraces the vicissitudes of verticality to a greater extent – in this instance, I perceive to Liverpool’s benefit because of their proximity and City’s backwards movement without time in possession preventing it being effective space manipulation because the ball carrier lacks the time to perceive and act on the new space, meaning it largely has a compacting effect.
In summation, Liverpool sought to exploit City’s main tool for consolidation in the addition of depth by gradually gaining territory and cutting off forward options via man-orientation, and in response, City increased their willingness to introduce depth which generated an additional degree of control as providing support subsequently was prioritised which undermined compaction and gradual encroachment efforts from Liverpool and provided the platform for longer balls in behind to undermine Liverpool’s vertical compactness. City in many ways replicated what Liverpool’s press attempted with regards to their gradual encroachment via the centre backs and Ederson, and knowledge that Henderson stepping up triggered Liverpool’s ball-oriented press, and thus, how to respond accordingly and moreover the lack of necessity to prepare around it should Henderson be dropping in accordance with City’s encroachment.
Despite potentially sounding critical of Liverpool, this piece has sought to eulogise about City and explore how they manipulated Liverpool’s advanced and solid block. This is pertinent to me because I place a lot of significance on the value of automatisms and deeper build-up as a method of space creation and Liverpool essentially nullify this aspect because of how effectively coordinated they are at gradually encroaching and maintaining vertical compactness and horizontal coverage until the moment comes to collectively pounce and force an error. Their reticence to engage extremely high unprovoked can control teams by blocking off space for short progression and forcing longer balls where they feel defensively assured with the presence of van Djik and Matip. They importantly do not cede control by leaving themselves vertically stretched, nor allow progression to more dangerous areas where space in behind becomes increasingly pertinent as the possession team advances.
City have a unique combination of qualities few teams in the world possess, as they are able to use a high-quality front 3 of direct runners in a game like this whilst that doesn’t collectively hurt them against deeper teams because of the ability to transition to a more control oriented duo of Mahrez and Grealish. Moreover, they possess versatile tight space specialists like Bernardo Silva, two terrific passers and ball progresses from CB (and GK), and an almost unparalleled quality from deep in João
Cancelo. This is not to denigrate from Guardiola’s plan, it successfully undermined what I consider to be the defending of the near future (increasingly adopted in the next 3-5 years as teams become increasingly proficient at playing out and using automatisms requiring increased vertical compactness) – rather it is to suggest that this defensive model remains extremely strong and undone by capacities which are presently unique to City (of which Guardiola is probably the largest component).
The base theory is simple – time and space in possession expose a high line; however, actualising that truism through avoiding superfluous steps, confidently introducing depth, and patiently circulating in addition to timing runs and positioning yourselves masterfully on an incredibly efficient offside line is a feat very difficult to replicate.