Vertical Distances and Inverted Full Backs
Why full backs should stay wide during deep build-up.
A 4-2-4 is used in deeper settings because the vertical dynamics created by higher pressing which frequently leads to winger positioning being higher to pin opposition defences to create additional space in between the 2nd and 3rd lines. The higher the initial positioning, the greater space there is to drop into if marked tightly, and the more dangerous the positioning if the press is broken centrally. Dropping deeper early allows for pitch condensation which is not conducive to press breaking unless part of a transitional automatism which seeks to create space to move into via dragging movements. Dropping is often done with the intent to receive the ball in near future of manipulate positioning of the opponent, with the static base being that of high and wide for wingers. The distances often mean they are difficult to directly access, particularly as the narrower positioning of the (opposition) full back can allow them to intercept central passes whilst floated balls are often nullified through the full backs ability to adapt as the ball travels. Additionally, because the stretched conditions facilitate a greater degree of man-orientation, it is easier to close down and quickly isolate the winger because of opposition deep commitment to create the stretched conditions initially. Therefore, inverted full backs to form the 4-1-5 shape would be easily constrained as accessing the wingers when facing pressure would be too difficult for the centre backs, leading to anticipatory positioning and pressing by the opposition which would reduce the size of the pitch. Hence, because you want the wingers high and wide while building deep, the full backs must widen to access the wingers directly through a vertical pass, working around opposition central compactness – or exploiting potential man orientation through increasing the spaces in the channels, leading to dropping forwards to receive with time and space.
This goalkeeper possession hopefully demonstrates that wingers are not reliably accessible wide actors because the distances involved weaken connections whilst the desire to vertically stretch remains – goalkeeper possession in particular is often unpressured and centralised and hence the best possible chance to access the winger with greater precision, but nonetheless, it remains overly risky when attempting to transition in a controlled manner – to compensate for compactness issues centrally which occur subsequently compared to a 4-1-5, a double pivot is created which provides ball-sided support to the respective full backs upon reception whilst the far-side member centralises to provide a link which means effective horizontal stretching should be maintained throughout.
Part of the rationale (with regards to moving away from 4-2-4 to a 4-1-5) can moreover be ascribed to the goalkeeper becoming a less active possession actor which requires the narrowing of the centre backs to strengthen connections without the link and subsequently the narrowing of the full backs in central possession to strengthen connections to the centre backs. Moreover, the lack of safety option moreover increases the risk of full back isolation (generally, but amplified by wide positioning if the ball is not moved quickly - why I call the deep full back a ‘transitional role’) meaning the goalkeeper is pertinent pertaining to depth as they are a short connecting option (with an additional degree of staggering to cover) to provoke a transition, whereas when passed to in higher regions of play, they act to consolidate and restart attacks, or form a 4-2-4 if under pressure. Hence, the lack of the +1 requires greater compaction between the outfield players to provide connections which coincides with accessible wingers nullifying the requirement for full backs to hold width in central possession.
Ultimately, the main reasoning I can deduce to as to why inverting full backs in deeper phases is suboptimal, is that stretched vertical conditions created make the wingers more difficult to directly access for central players. The ramification from this widening to create effective width is the necessity for a greater central presence created in lieu of inverted full backs, hence the dropping of a central midfielder to become a member of a double pivot, allowing ball-sided support to be provided to the full back whilst a central link remains, allowing the far-sided full back to be wider, to potentially receive with diagonality and push forward, as the depth of play continues to mean that the full back narrowing as a link, does not work because the distance to the winger is still too large, whilst subtracting a supporting number would allow the oppositions far-side player to compact play too easily. More compact outfield play can still occur, such as narrow centre back double pivot goal kicks which often seek central superiority through narrowing play around the box where the full backs frequently sit at the edge of the 18 yard-box rather than outside it, showing the pertinence of CB positioning with regards to full back positioning vis-à-vis connections. This is typically in response to narrower pressure where even with their depth, an extremely wide full back would be difficult to access, meaning they are not creating maximum effective width by touchline hugging.
Side note to picture which will be elaborated on less directly below: Slightly different situations, however I feel the extremity of Walkers inversion highlight my point – place the wider player in between the lines for consistent diagonality from centre-to-half-space-to-wing. Diagonality is pertinent because it allows the space to be directly attacked upon the players reception, as the ball moves ahead of them, and into their stride.
Moreover, creating this wider full back still influenced by the heuristic of narrow on the far-side – wide on the ball-side, can be created in a manifold of ways, such as Bernando dropping in the image above and Walker coming narrow – as they are fulfilling far-side double pivot and full backs roles respectively, maintaining good occupation of vertical corridors and providing a pathway through links, created either directly or in this case, indirectly through the narrowing of Smith-Row’s position to cover Walker. This image occurs higher than the instances being discussed typically, but highlights very good progressive positioning, with the staggered linking process. Nevertheless, against pressure, an additional wide link, typically wider the deeper play is because the stretched conditions reduce access meaning horizontal central compactness is more exploitable with fewer numbers is important – who forms it does not matter, the important aspect transitionally is the creation of a 4-2-4 like support structure.
The importance of context is paramount with regards to positioning rather than following rigid depth guide, as the opposition are a crucial reference point for positioning. Here, after reconsolidating via the keeper for example, the space is in between the 1st and 2nd vertical lines because the backwards movement provoked varying intensities from the defensive lines makes Dodô directly accessible with diagonality, allowing him to continue the transition seamlessly. Wider positioning is superfluous because of the narrow, detached shape by Genk allows him space to charge into. Better vertical compactness here would likely force wider play because of the symbiotic relationship between horizontal and vertical compactness whereby, vertical compactness would grant Dodô a lack of space to run into, forcing him around. Therefore, depth is not the only consideration with regards to how wide full backs should be.
Preceding image: imagine Dodô’s CB received the ball and was placed under intense pressure. Dropping and going wider would be correct to provide support and detach the Genk shape to create space in the channels, the forwards pressing would cut the narrow angle, thus forcing the passing lane to be extended via width rather than verticality (opposite for wide pressing lane cutting compared to vertical pressing); however as occurred on the ball side, extreme widening wasn’t required in response to pressing because the full back pass was a free option, hence detaching himself from central support and forcing ball-sidedness was unnecessary. Nonetheless, he is wider and deeper than Dodô to make the pass more open and the forwards pressing of the CB + the passing lane more difficult. The slightly wider positioning (compared to inverted) allows him to access the winger with diagonality which is preferable, receive freely with a central passing option and reduce the risk of interception. Thus, very wide full backs are a response to pressure in an attempt to manipulate opposition positioning to benefit from the width created – it forces pressing to be more wide than vertical, thus working against predominately vertical (striker to centre back for example) pressing.
However, central control is preferred – which is aided by narrowing (wider edge of the half-space) of positioning – provided effective width is maintained because it increases the time and options the full back has upon reception. These concepts are quite abstract, and I imagine difficult to build an intuition for in a coaching perspective because the varying triggers are complex – hence the blanket 4-1-5 consolidated 4-2-4 transitional provides a basepoint for understanding from which nuance of the varying spectrum between wide and fully inverted can be explored in response to opposition triggers.
When building deep against passive pressure – forward pressing 2 with midfield support – high-to-mid block style, Manchester City opt to remain with a single pivot with wide full backs, frequently using Ederson to change sides. I think this makes progressing centrally and using overload to isolate type transitional circumstances difficult as Rodri can find himself isolated centrally, facing back towards play with few options which forces progressing down the ball-side or backwards, switching sides through Ederson, where Rodri then must shuttle and support again. The backwards-up movement is typically sufficiently large against this type of press to neuter transitions. The extra player provided by the 4-2-4 makes switching easier and allows for quick overloads to occur after switching with greater ease, despite often requiring a reduced central presence in higher areas.
Celtic under Ange Postecoglou adopt a similar set-up when under pressure, favouring a continued use of a single pivot.
Callum McGregor here shows an advantage of this which is the ability to positively bypass pressure through instigating underlapping movements, with this providing additional support on the ball side without requiring a forward to drop deeper, as the central striker can move to support whereas in a 4-2-4 set-up there is no central striker, hence dropping to support in a similar manner (albeit it would be a drop and turn) would reduce attacking potency as upon reception, as both he and the winger would have one fewer options. Thus, I am more inclined to call a single-pivot set-up ball-side committal in breaking the pressure, although once broken, the now far-side full back can invert into the double pivot position and provide the backwards link to the underloaded side where the interiour player and winger reside. Progression was achieved on the ball side, making the wingers accessible after the switch, thus altering vertical circumstances to allow for effective inversion and maintenance of width.
This is perhaps a reason behind why the centre backs are positioned wider in addition to the full backs contrasted to De Zerbi teams, as pressure is bypassed through the ball-side primarily, with new links being established as lines are broken to the midfielder – opening vertical-to-horizontal lanes, which places a reduced emphasis on central control and an increased emphasis on stretching the oppositions shape maximally. This makes breaking pressure easier, as you commit more towards the ball side and can push full backs higher, although for that reason is potentially riskier against higher pressure because you are less able to circulate it in your own third through short passing combinations. Celtic overall this season from what I have seen have been highly effective at wide rotations and achieving good coordination from the players on the ball side, but I would argue this effect is most potent in the 2nd and final 3rds rather than the first.
My preference remains for the De Zerbian approach because I feel it creates an additional degree of security through not overloading the pivot which means possession can be kept more stably against higher pressure because the full backs are less easily constrained. But, I understand why the reduced support to wingers upon reception is an issue as there is one fewer high but nevertheless staggered behind ball-sided player. Isolation for teams such as City and Celtic which rarely face high pressure is potentially a tangential issue, with the base set-up being prepared around lighter pressing where the 5+ safety option of the GK spread horizontally around the pitch is sufficient and where breaking and transitioning quickly is more pertinent, where the additional player and horizontal coverage help.
Overall, Guardiola does not invert his full backs in deep build-up (without midfield compensation where they fulfil the role of a full back) whilst a (rare) issue I have had with Celtic this season is Anthony Ralston inverting deep while access to further width, either a dropping midfielder or a winger has not been available leading to play being more easily funnelled and constrained. This is rarely exposed, as similar to City against Southampton, they often achieve the numerical superiority with the single pivot and are able to bypass pressure through consistently finding the free man who opens as lines are broken. I do understand this does play into the overload the ball-side through complementary movement aspect of Celtic’s game where their wide rotations are incredible, which require a greater degree of vertical staggering. Nevertheless, any team courageous enough to attempt intense high pressure, I feel this variable is exploitable against Celtic. The best example I have seen this season came in the second half at Easter Road against Hibs, a game where both myself and Luke (who has a Substack and Twitter I would recommend following) were impressed by the intensity and success of the press in negating Celtic’s shorter build-up.