Against Newcastle, Pep Guardiola invoked a degree of situational asymmetry not typically associated with rigid conceptions of positional play, as Foden was granted the capacity to roam and harness the gravitational pull he feels towards the ball.
Watching Phil Foden’s gesticulations during a game is one of my favourite activities to do when watching City. He is constantly asking for the ball to feet, always making slight movements to be in position to receive. When Manchester City have possession, there is not a moment he is switched off. He is continuously wondering and working how to get the ball. When watching him play, you can tell there is a genuine love for just getting touches of the ball and being constantly involved.
When he played false 9 for Manchester City, I described this as a type of ball magnetism which consistently provided a +1 to allow City to seamlessly move through the thirds, using him as the focal point for recycling possession. The freedom provided by this role allowed the gravitational pull he feels for the ball to manifest unconstrained. In many ways, his positional intelligence reminds me of Bernardo Silva. They both have wonderful spatial awareness, close control, and ball retention in addition to a willingness to recycle (although Bernardo is more of a mini-Pep on the pitch, tempo setter and postionally rigid as will be discussed later, in contrast to Foden). I imagine it is the analogous behaviour that Pep references when discussing Phil’s potential to play deeper. I do not think the role suits him, because it is too positionally constrained, with recycling responsibilities being more systematic and static in contrast to the freedom provided by the false 9 position, which granted almost complete horizontal and vertical freedom.
It is these aspects of magnetism and horizontal floating which I want to highlight in reference to his performance against Newcastle, which is the most reminiscent I have seen of him since 21/22. Fundamentally, I perceive the wing as far too constrained an environment for a player of his qualities and while an ironclad rule of tactical analysis is that they who dares to question Guardiola will inevitably suffer the consequences for their hubris, it has been an area where I have disagreed with him consistently.
I think a reason his floating worked particularly well against Newcastle relates to their pressing proclivities and desire to first allow Manchester City forward while sitting in a mid-block to then use triggers towards man-orientation to force play backwards and gradually encroach. As play is moving backwards, there is an inertia period in between the lines which leads to play being less compact as the defence responds to the encroaching midfield. It is in these moments that movement towards the ball becomes useful as it provides an escape to oncoming man-orientation, as horizontal tracking is rarely seen, particularly within back 4 shapes.
For Dan Burn, tasked with tracking Phil Foden when Newcastle were pressing higher, this created a situation of zugzwang (as a low Elo player, I am likely using this wrong - but stick with me), a Chess term referring to where there are no ‘positive’ moves. When Foden floated to the left of Manchester City’s attack there was an easy overload as Burn did not track him in these instances, with Grealish, Alvarez and Haaland occupying the respective near-side defenders, granting him space to drift into without the worry of a defender pouncing behind him. This is the classical conundrum associated with roaming players; most notably the traditional false 9. Do you track to prevent the overload, thereby leaving space exposed or do you leave him to maintain structure, allowing the overload. Zugzwang.
This is where the term zugzwang applies: the asymmetric ball-seeker in many ways increases the chances of a positive outcome occurring for City if we view this from a homogenised tripartite perspective: positive (progression) vs negative (turnover) vs neutral (resetting), Foden’s asymmetric dropping only ever resulted in positive or neutral outcomes for City, with Newcastle lacking an appropriate response. Of course, the idea of a homogenised positive doesn’t exist and there are trade-offs to consider as it negates maximal efficacy in transition due to reduced connections to the flank, a lack of consistent high and wide player to connect and fewer and less effective 2v1 overload to isolate situation. Whether it is a ‘net positive’ overall depends on many factors; however, I think it was the crucial tactical aspect in why City looked so unfazed and dominant against a fantastic Newcastle side.
During the first 10 minutes, the struggle Burn was undergoing was particularly visible, as the deviation from high and wide wingers which was likely prepared for proved challenging, with him constantly being pulled out of position. In addition to this, Walker was holding width rather than tucking into the back 3. When City attracted pressure deep and enticed Newcastle’s press forward, Burn would initially track Foden’s leftward movement towards the ball, allowing Ederson to find Walker isolated on the right flank, as Gordon was responsible for out-to-in narrow pressing/CB tight marking. Subsequently, Burn would engage in more emergency style defending to recover his position. This often meant the line deepened because of Walker’s wide progression when free, with Burn in particular deep as he sought to get behind the ball, which then opened space in between the lines for now free Foden to link-up with Walker. The other alternative for Newcastle was the midfield going backwards collectively to congest Foden out of play, which would then allow City to establish possession higher – negating one of Newcastle’s main tactical strengths – their intense high press.
Or:
Around the 15th minute, Newcastle functionally changed to a back 5 off the ball, with Gordon aligning himself positionally with Walker, allowing Burn to tuck inside and perform more of a man-oriented role on Foden without having to worry about space in behind.
Provoking this response should be perceived positively overall, and reinforces the zugzwang conception, as Newcastle’s appropriate adjustment weakened their main strength. Foden’s drifting forced them into a less familiar, less proactive defensive shape which created more time in possession deep for City players due to reduced midfield (and therefore forward) coverage considering the encroaching cascading mechanisms Newcastle use to press.
In response to this, Foden started moving wider to dismark from Burn, causing Gordon problems and pushing Dan Burn over, leaving gaps exposed in Newcastle’s defence. The higher pressing issues moreover were not fully alleviated as Gordon continued to have the responsibility to push high on the RCB from higher pressing situations, leaving Walker free in deep build-up.
I think Foden’s constant awareness emphasises the importance of timing when playing this role, as it requires subtle movement to dismark and exploit being on the midfielder’s blind-side. Timing your drop to receive when a pass is likely to be played to maximise the space available before the opposition catch onto what is happening. Using the initiative granted by the freedom of roaming to minimise the amount of time the opponent has to react to the small deviations.
As the game progressed, the midfield became increasingly aware of the extra responsibility to maintain high levels of compactness around Foden – but this in combination with Gordon being deeper than usual allowed City to control the game much more easily, as the players ahead of the midfield line had more time in possession, and easy recycling options, as the players closer to the far-side became progressively freer. Oftentimes when Walker was found, his progression once he had possession was stopped, but this was still frequently used for territorial gain and backwards recycling, attempting to move the ball to the opposite flank – or expose the inertia period of pushing forward to find Foden or Alvarez in between the lines.
Whenever Newcastle progressed, or attempted something more proactive, spaces would be exposed that a drifting Foden could access
It also allowed more traditional moves to open space for Walker like the diagonal run in behind to create separation against the back 4 and exploit the overload of 5v4 horizontally when the wing-back onrushes.
Overall, I think playing Foden as the right interior was decisive in nullifying Newcastle’s attacking threat as it forced adaptions which limited how well they could press in addition to upsetting structure generally which led to more inefficiencies. They struggled to cope with his roaming in between the lines, whilst his pass, touch, pass style helped progression as his bounce passes forced the defence backwards, establishing better territorial control. In addition, it generally aided in not losing possession and generating effective chance creating opportunities when he could turn and face the defence.
It moreover facilitated the creation of a different type of threat from Walker, as a deep runner who could use his momentum and isolation to pose a significant threat against Newcastle’s back-line as the recipient of possession from overload to isolate situations, and in the first 15 minutes, the beneficiary of Foden dragging Dan Burn.
Fitting Foden and Kevin de Bruyne centrally in the same team will, I think, be the primary conundrum for Pep Guardiola this season as he has been reticent to play the two as dual interiors. Part of this is due to Kevin de Bruyne being a player being suited to sitting in high regions, particularly with City’s newer method of chance creation as they are increasingly facing somewhat man-oriented blocks whereby they seek to build 3v3 attacking transitions direct through Ederson. The one thing that was lacking for Foden this game was the timing and weighting of the final ball to Haaland, so it is an area de Bruyne has a massive comparative advantage in – something increasingly pertinent as City look to transition from deeper more frequently. So rather than being the higher player dropping, as suites Foden’s skill set, he will naturally have to be deeper and start from the left, meaning his involvement are more structurally integrated as compared to a floating +1 where he has thrived. In addition, playing on the same flank as Grealish often requires movement which is more advanced rather than dropping as he is an outlet for progression that requires runs to help create space and separation to dribble.Foden can do this, but it does not maximise his abilities, similar to the wing problem. He is still excellent there, but it is not where he would excel compared to having people running beyond him to maximise space in between the lines and act as the teams main vertical stretchers.
Both Foden and de Bruyne are ‘circuit-breakers’ to use a term coined by Ange Postecoglou, but Foden is a high touch player as well which contrasts to de Bruyne who is more decisive in his actions. In this regard, he may upset rhythm, tempo, and positioning, as both his and de Bruyne’s desire to roam and get involved in ways which are not structured could lead to Guardiola believing the attacking line is too disconnected, or at least not connected to the same extent, leading to more turnovers or less efficient overload to isolate scenarios. As noted, the high touch nature of his play may make him less suited for the interior role beside Grealish, who requires support for his high-touch playstyle, often provided by Bernardo or Gundogan in previous years. Kovacic has arguably provided an alteration in that regard with his deeper sitting role, but this needs to be contextualised with the increasing freedom seen from Alvarez down that flank.
Potentially looking for overly legible answers to this problem is fallacious. They could just lack chemistry and not be a good fit when playing together for whatever reason.
To provide a degree of contrast – Bernardo Silva played a similar role against Sheffield United; and although apples to apples comparisons prove difficult because of the vastly different approaches of Newcastle and Sheffield United, some analysis of on ball actions in between the lines, likelihood to drop deep and recycle, the quickness of bounce passes, how they position themselves etc., should be useful.
The primary difference I could ascertain was Bernardo plays the role more positionally compared to the freedom afforded to or taken by Foden. Bernardo was much more vertical in his interpretation, staying within his corridor and primarily seeking to go deeper or more advanced as a way of finding the ball. Drop deep and around the opponents structure to connect to the right flank compared to going towards the ball to get actively involved and provide overloads down the left. In this regard, City’s play was much less asymmetric, as Bernardo rarely drifted to get involved but rather waited for the ball to come to him – something much more aligned with how City seek to play generally.
In many ways it looked like he was more oriented around manipulating the positioning of LCM Hamer, as he was consistently following pressure – keeping in close proximity and looking to confuse the marking roles between him (LCM) and the centre back.
Part of me thinks this was done to help City sustain pressure by occupying the midfielder and through close proximity preventing him from stepping up on the centre back (usually Dias) as the covering mechanism which allows that – CB man-orientation in between the 2nd and 3rd lines was nullified by Bernardo’s close positioning.
This type of following pressure role is potentially perceived as too constraining for Foden.
Bernardo’s aim was to create ambiguity in between the lines for when the LCM stepped up and force the LCB to move further up the pitch to compensate once the LCM’s jump had been triggered.
When attacking in the final third additionally, because of the following pressure element to open space, once Dias or whoever was progressing provoked proximity on the LCM, Bernardo would drift slightly wider to receive and attempt to connect with Walker down the right – usually resulting in a cross or possession recycling. This is contrasted to Foden’s greater willingness to attempt to move centrally and play more incisive passes.
The attacking approach was more that of pinning and sustaining pressure. Attempting to force Sheffield United’s defence backwards to limit transition strength, increase the chance of winning second balls and make the 2nd ball locations more advantageous. Additionally, I would argue Bernardo is more comfortable with traditional 1v1 duelling which he was often required to do after under/overlapping to support Walker. Standing his defender up and maintaining possession. As with all Foden caveats, he can do this extremely well, but is better suited to central dribbling comparatively.
The approach taken is textbook Pep and working from memory something explicitly referenced this in Pep Confidential. You look to play on ricochets and bounces once you’ve established control in the opponent’s territory and nullified transitional threat. You create shots through progressing and forcing emergency defending, upsetting structure in areas where millisecond advantages can be decisive, and variance benefit the attackers. Think of Rodri’s goal in the Champions League final as evidence. Force the defence deep, play attrition-based football then dominate the opponents box.
This is particularly effective against back 5’s which generally prioritise horizontal defensive coverage over vertical coverage to spring forward and press following a clearance. In addition to these shapes generally being more man-oriented in deeper phases but requiring spatial protection once the last line is broken, meaning more emergency defending is engaged in as players look to reactively switch from man to zonal.
This links to another point – for Foden, the game against Newcastle was his. He was the primary player forced with dictating and progressing play, likely due to the quickness and quality of his actions against a higher pressing team. Against Brentford, the unstoppable guy was Jack Grealish, where gravity and attracting players in addition to forcing the opposition deeper was used to unsettle the block. Bernardo was more of a cog, with his following pressure positioning meaning he was always on the radar of the LCM, preventing full compaction and generally forcing him wider. The aim was not to quickly burst when a pocket was exposed, a la Foden, but rather keep the pocket open for others and link wide when receiving to allow City to gain ground via Grealish back passes – or have that option create more space for a dribble down the line.
I think the positioning of Bernardo himself can be ascribed to similar reasons; it was to allow Walker to progress down the flank quicker than having a better connection to the right wing for a through pass. The game for City was about territorial control then 2nd balls rather than attempting to find space in between the lines to expose the last line, something more suited to Foden. Moreover, because Grealish was often the player progressing play, there needed to be a far-side box presence to occupy the wing-back which would grant Walker more freedom to attack space from second balls or recycling. The rigidity and more positional nature of Bernardo provided balance to attack the flanks vertically.
The aspect of being a vertical pinner to create space for Walker became more pertinent as Sheffield United acquiesced more, with this being his role as they progressed into the final third to then connect. Following pressure was to create the space to progress, which became less pertinent as progression became easier. In accordance with this, as Kovacic pushed forward to occupy the left half-space, Alvarez was the player given more of a free role, and perhaps became the more apt comparison, with his player focusing more on darting runs to dismantle the defence than receiving the ball.
Foden did have a small but decisive cameo against Sheffield United and even within that time the difference in playstyles was notable – albeit the 1-1 game state was likely to make City want a more direct player. With Foden coming deep and asking for the ball and following his momentum to link-up on the left flank even if it left the right half-space vacated.
The trouble this greater fluidity caused ultimately lead to his incidental assist. And although a few too many contingency factors were at play to attribute it to this change solely, such as the box collision leading to a mix-up and Walker’s unexpected ball recovery. Nevertheless, his movement and willingness to get onto the ball provided an extra spark for City.
Going from here:
To here:
Prior to the goal.
Ultimately, I think the opposition’s approach influenced player choice, with the ball-seeking nature of Foden being suited to transitional games against higher pressing teams where finding space in between the lines in deeper regions is more pertinent to creating goal scoring opportunities. He potentially lacks the containment perceived as necessary when playing centrally to break down deeper opponents, as Guardiola wants the ball to move to players in a structural way rather than incorporating the structure around ball-seeking.
His ball-seeking adds a little more directness to City’s game as he is more likely to move with play, upsetting stucture and therefore the ability to maintain the ball safely in most instances. That is not to call him direct in a similar way to de Bruyne for instance, who frequently tries risky passes and is much less likely to bounce, or position himself to bounce, but rather in the circuit-breaker way mentioned before.
My aesthetic preference for him probably clouds any attempt at objectivity, and he may lack the ruthlessness of Haaland and de Bruyne as City’s unstoppable guys; but nevertheless, I at least want to see a team where he thrives.