When preparing to write this post, I envisaged it being different from my typical meandering look into a broader theoretical idea through the structure of team, and what I derived from them; however, I found this artificial structure of a team report esque approach stifling and generally less enjoyable than pursuing whatever interested me in each moment and examining it in more detail. I relied on my salience filter to dictate what was important and interesting to me, and worked from there. Therefore, rather than being a comprehensive overview of the minutia of Hibs system under Maloney, these are my general thoughts on his management. The main features investigated are the use of wide build-up in deep regions in particular to create space, why this was the most effective element of his reign, why the subsequent transitions often failed, a more abstract conception of control, why Hibs lacked it, why it was important given the risk-averse structure of attacking and lastly why the two final games against Hearts showed the most promise in deviating away from risk aversion.
TL;DR/primer – don’t be influenced by the there being fewer positives than improvements, the weighting isn’t proportionate, and as the post will hopefully reveal its often a case of more of this positive (making it a negative thereby because of its lack):
Positives:
· Wide space creation
· Encouraging wide centre back movement into those spaces to create overloads and infiltrate in between the lines (symbiotic effect of horizontal and vertical stretching)
· Use of hold-up forwards to access space in between the lines
· Wing-back runs in more transitional circumstances
· Fluid use of the dynamic superiority when attacking space in between the lines when using Jasper and Mueller
· Good man-oriented pressure, forwards are aware of how to carry runs and good communication when pressing
· Promising squad with a lot of potential
· Midfield closed body reception got progressively better – Henderson an exemplar
Improvements:
· Maintain width better after transitional commitment
· Spacing improvements in overload to isolate situations
· Greater encouragement of tighter link up in the final third, accordingly, reduce reliance on crossing for chance creation
· Allow centre backs more positional freedom and encourage rotations with midfielders to carry runs and maintain dynamic superiority and link well (compensating for lack of deep half-space presence)
· Embrace fluid movement in between the lines and chose profiles accordingly.
· Personnel improvement in goals, with that hopefully breeding an increased commitment to circulating deep and baiting pressure.
· More active support to the ball in non-semi-automatised situations.
· More active commitment towards pressing high
· Greater freedom for defenders to engage aggressively rather than sitting off collectively when the opposition is attacking space.
· Greater emphasis on the ball as a reference point to force errors and make long balls less controlled to unsettle opposition
· Don’t go short enough from GK’s
A concept commonly used by Hibs is to widen the position of the near-side centre back disproportionally down the left flank, which I surmise is qualitatively influenced by Lewis Stevenson’s frequent presence at left centre back, feeling comfortable in those zones, whilst Cadden’s pace on the opposite flank is moreover a valuable asset when performing overload to isolate manoeuvres which requires the far-side full back to attack space (it should be noted, later discussed issues are generally less prevalent when following the pattern of left-to-right, contrasted to right-to-left). This typically occurs in deeper phases of play because it looks to exploit the symbiotic relationship between vertical and horizontal stretching. Through playing wider, Hibs seek to move around the opposition’s compactness, creating time, space, and new accessible passing angles while the opponent adjusts their compactness. Particularly against sides which feature less ball-orientation and intensity, newly open wide angles can be maintained by gradual widening via dribbling, either when not under pressure, or facing in-to-out pressure. These new passing lanes are the result of the aforementioned symbiosis, as through going wide you avoid the compactness, while the new passing lanes are open because the opponent are vertically stretched, hence making the depth of the centre back key in the equation, and explaining why the sequences occur deeper, as they are more difficult against greater vertical compactness which occurs as play progresses into the oppositions half. Moreover, the time to execute the dribble, find the pass and create the support structure cannot be created other deep through centre backs. I would count this out-to-in vertical line cutting pass towards the centre a trademark under Shaun Maloney. The aim of these sequences is to access the half-spaces, and prior to injury, Kevin Nisbet was the primary recipient. The reliance on Nisbet in these areas could make the attack more insipid because he was expected to play a multifaceted role perhaps not suited to his profile, because involvement deep limited his box presence from deeper transitions, meaning the tools required to create the chance creating transition often nullified the chance itself as covering the ground sufficiently to maintain pace with the ball as difficult.
Additionally, diagonality is preferable of to direct verticality, because the former reduces flexibility of the receiver by forcing a back-to-goal slow approach, negating the potential for a reverse pass or moving to the ball with momentum as the defender can remain rigidly tight rather than reaction to deviations presented by the more dynamic ball state (apologies for the horribly jargonistic term, couldn’t think of a better one, essentially more variables and potential are presented by an angled ball). Zonal systems generally better suited to closing these angles contrasted to man-oriented systems because the shuttling is more proactively designed to force down the line verticality, which considered most opposition approaches in Scotland when higher pressing makes adopting this type of build-up understanding as a space creation tool. However, even with down the line verticality, Hibs have been disposed to attempting one-two combinations to bypass the opponent’s pressure and create an overload for the player marking the diagonal passing lane.
When viewing moves in more direct vertical build-up, aspects such as the comparative fields of visions of passer (game ahead and is aware of defensive set-up) contrasted to receiver, back to goal, limiting his vision should be considered. This type of reception often lacks instant transitional potential unless the forward is hyper aware of surroundings, such as automatised sequences which allow a more blind reverse ball to be played in between the lines – I interpret a degree of at least ‘working on’ this reverse pass combination going off of Nisbet and Mitchell’s link-up. In these situations, the opposition midfields are in front of the ball creating a transitional chance due to time to receive. The opposition will attempt to compact, so to prevent a turnover, the receiving player will need a suitable support structure around him. The individual profile of the receiving player can alter the optimal structure. Some players are comfortable receiving the ball with their back to goal others more suited to changing direction in one fluid movement – analysed in more depth here Phil Foden is magical. Hold-up favours nearby supporting players whereas decreased opposition compactness (generally beneficial but particularly pertinent in these cases, as a hold-up forward can use his presence against a defender whereas the dribbly type requires initiative through deeper movement and hence space unless they have Phil Foden levels of tight control) suites fluidly moving dribblers capable of turning a defender and opening forward access. Hibs under Maloney have fluid dribbler profiles in Jasper and Mueller, who both thrived in the interiour role in a 3-4-3, which was accordingly was something I wanted to see more frequently following Nisbets injury. In these situations, quickly zipping the ball into the outside of their boot to turn a tight defender can be useful. While an excellent receiver (I really don’t want to underemphasise just how highly I rate this aspect of his game and how much this aspect increases the fluidity of transitions) like Henderson could do the first stage, but often struggle to directly exploit space if a pass was not on. This made him less back to goal against a tight marker in orientation and more somebody who could use the dynamic superiority of compacting laterally and exploit his great touch away from defenders. The wide diamond created plenty of these opportunities, particularly as most tracking was man-oriented meaning the opposition were always one step behind. Nonetheless, Maloney exhibited a preference for direct vertical build-up using wide regions a forward with strong hold-up play to find onrushing wingbacks. This explains the potentially counterintuitive James Scott against Hearts in the semi-final, due to the roaming potential of Henderson and others in the spaces created through wide overloads to play off a forward – launching attacks down the far side to Cadden rather than moving through tight spaces to find the near-side overlapping wingback.
Against more man-oriented set-ups which continue to allow the centre backs time in possession, a similar end-result of accessing the dropping forward can be achieved by horizontal stretching via positioning, while the vertical dynamics act to give the striker more space to drop into. Against Livingston for example, Paul McGinn acting as RCB played the ball to the near-side wing-back for a wall pass which triggered their ball-sided man-orientation. Hibs players did not rush to support the ball carrier compacting play, which suggests to something pre-ordained, as they performed counter-intuitive moves if analysed action by action (such as not supporting the ball-carrier) which can only be understood with the end-goal of horizontally stretching to open access via the channel while using the near-side centre back as the free man. Caution should be taken with this conclusion, especially if it was an ‘if-then’ scenario as Ewan Henderson underlapped which stretched play but also theoretically opened up a wider more directly progressive pass. I am still inclined to suggest a semi-automatism (practiced in training as a method – wall-pass up-back through) rather than pure spontaneity because of the speed at which Chris Cadden played possession back to McGinn. From that breaking of the lines, because of reticence to track Nisbet tightly, a series of overloads occur as Nisbet can distribute to the onrushing wing-back who has a natural underlap or pass backwards in Henderson. This can be more broadly categorised in the wide diamond dynamics whereby the deep ball carrier has four feasible options to his left, right and vertical. The right and left stretch the defence, generating central passing lanes which can be exploited with time and space in possession frequently allowed to deeper players. The centremost player can often compact and look to access the passing lane forward through directly playing it upon reception, before the opposition pressure shuts down space, this again requires some degree of coordination, whether automatised or not, as fully exploiting the dynamic superiority against the man-oriented markers is key. This happened more on the right flank due to Cadden’s pace seems the most plausible reasoning.
Relatively passive man-oriented set-ups are where this play thrives most because of the positional manipulation potential to craft anticipatable positions whilst the lack of direct ball oriented pressure although the passer more time to accurately – this type of set-up is not uncommon in Scotland and I think games such as Motherwell (higher intensity of pressing comparatively and an interesting team in their own regard), St. Mirren and Livingston to some extent is where Hibs exhibited some of their best passing sequences. Imagine - wide diamond, Nisbet drops with initiative, and can receive turning into the space on the far side to forward his body orientation, now having access in behind while under little direct pressure in between the lines. Teams man orient to make reception back-to goal and compensate for lost compactness via this compacting and delaying tool; however, this can be negated through a strong, technical forward or previously mentioned fluid player Hibs lacked, and I think the absence of Nisbet accordingly limited Hibs capacity to build-up strongly because his more complete profile suited Maloney excellently as it allowed for greater adaptability to opposition responses; however, even in Nisbets absence, hold-up play was good. The issue with Maloney at Hibs, therefore, was not space creation in deeper areas, but rather as will be explored, exploitation said space, with issues pertaining to spacing, and decision making, with the two concepts not being mutually exclusive, as if the wingback lacks a half-space passing option, what is he supposed to do other than run down the byline and cross.
The sequence mentioned against St. Mirren also highlighted a general concern over the one-dimensionality often exhibited by the wingbacks, whereby they tunnel vision down the space in the flanks to the byline and get in a cross from wide, rather than play it backwards for a deep half-space cross, exploiting the attention drawn for a better crossing angle with less chance of it getting directly blocked. This aspect was highlighted particularly against St. Mirren following successful deep build-up, where the wing-back, particularly Mitchell would aim towards the byline single-mindedly. Another potential issue is the wing-back remaining too wide in overload to isolate circumstances created by wide build-up, where upon breaking pressure, the central player seeking to expose the space moves towards the wing-back and ideally plays a pass with diagonality for them to rush onto, but where in many instances the wing-back maintains width, often leaving themselves isolated and with the end result of a wide cross. I think preferably they move inwards, while still maintaining space from their marker; in the final third say, move towards the edge of the box, because after an advanced overload to isolate, a finalising action is expected rather than possession maintenance or ball progression from deeper where the wider positioning makes more sense. Centralising in these instances is committal, but given the depth of play, that is not necessarily a bad thing because direct chance creation is the aim. There is moreover an issue of once centralising, lacking an attempt to get someone to fill wide areas after the initial attack failed, stifling the potential of sustaining pressure through possession.
In deeper regions where this move is executed, ball-sided overcommitment to bait and escape the pressure drawn via wide play can be an issue. The wide wing-back’s positioning is more justifiable because the depth of play requires more time to progress upon reception, and as there is more time between the decisive action and progressive actions, the defender has more time to close. Generally, the more advanced the ball is, the more split-second moments of freedom matter, hence, greater centrality at the cost of width can be preferred. This should moreover be noted to be referencing transitional moments, in consolidated phases, wing-back maintained of width, or upon a failed (inside) run, covering is crucial to ensure the oppositions defensive line remains stretched, and an outlet for recycling persists for the ball carrier. Additionally these are finalising actions to holding anticipatory maximum width is less important – because the end goal is there, rather than being prepared, 1 or 2 steps ahead in possession. Tangent aside, they often lack direct connections to exploit the wing-backs freedom, often because ball reception does not directly face play closing the window for a diagonal and generally reducing the fluidity of play, in addition to their being no deeper connecting player in the far-side half-space. A potential solution, although risky and player profile dependant is like that adopted by Antonio Conte’s Inter of pushing the wide centre back forward whilst having a midfielder dropping in, allowing for the other defenders to expand postionally therein to cover spatially, while permitting the maintenance of the dynamic superiority and the fluidity of the transition as the player naturally steps up while a chain of covering occurs. Even without adopting this more complex and risky rotational style, pushing the midfield higher and trusting the defence to cover in an aggressive man-oriented manner in cases of turnover would be preferable to add more fluidity to the transition from flank to flank and better exploit the space created through good ball-sided overloading. Accordingly, I think many of the final third issues can be attributed to poor access limiting the transitional potential, which is structural and linked to risk aversion rather than anything that can be isolated to that third. As Juanma Lillo notes, “The principal idea of Positional Play is that players pass the ball to each other in close spaces to be able to pass to a wide-open man.”; however, I feel this quote has the potential to be misinterpreted, because the wide-open man is often closer than perceived rather than being the direct switch, who because of the inertia time of ball travel can be closed down upon reception and isolated, contrasted to the near-half-space reception to link and generate a 2v1 in response to the opposition compacting in a tighter area.
To frame it in positional play terms, the far-side half-space in advanced regions was often unoccupied barring the centre back, and maybe a deeper midfielder, disconnected from the higher play, which limited the extent to which transitions could be fluid because the far-side connections were poor making it easier for the opposition to regroup. If a player in the half-space receives from a half-space to half-space switch, they instantly create a 2v1 for the overloaded opposition defender contrasted to ball carrying to access or a diagonal which generates a 1v1 (in the context of lack of over/underlapping centre back). The defender can therefore maintain his compact positioning while not needing to engage, allowing an easier jump to wingback, limiting crossing opportunities and forcing any opportunities which do arise wider. A half-space connector allows for fluid transitions and critical moments of delay before making the decision, as he provokes the proximity, allowing for more contextual adaptation based on box movements. He can hold while progressing until engaged, then play it to the wingback to receive in a deeper, more critical region to drill the ball across the box while he can centralising building off of aforementioned premises. Promising sequences could occur ad-hoc, such as when Cadden was placed in a deeper half-space position following reconsolidation from a back pass to Macey. He could carry his run forward into space, perform a one-two whilst Jasper held width in his absence. This paradigm of narrow-wide with regards to vertical width dynamics is one I prefer because I feel it keeps more of the pitch open to progress whilst nevertheless stretching possession – this triangle could however hypothetically be formed by a wide centre back, interiour player, and wing-back rather than being something serendipitous.
The position that matters is that on the pitch, rather than the concept of where to play – I feel wider centre backs should not be discouraged from participating in these actions which attack space because they are called centre backs, which often felt the case. The player being deeper in the half-space helps progression through acting as a connecting link while the width being higher makes sense, so they simultaneously vertically and horizontally stretch, posing a threat while an infiltratory run inside the channels. The all-too-common dynamic was wide-narrow in width where the deeper player was wider and inaccessible whilst the narrower player was in between the lines lacking direct support and easier for the opposition to compact upon. It too often required the team to go down for the centre backs to start showing ambition in attack, although even then, efforts to sustain pressure were often negated by a lack of willingness to circulate, moving the opposition, combining tight and looking for an opening to emerge in favour of crossing from wide regions against more settled defences where the 1v1 defender was often parallel to block.
When facing less intense pressure thus allowing the wider centre back to hold the ball for a greater duration, the width of the wingbacks is crucial in creating many of Hibs most dangerous opportunities because the opposition prizes central compactness, resulting in them being the freest player. This can manifest particularly dangerously when linking up with a forward drifting into the half-space because the vertical ball played can cut through lines (which are stretched because of the wing-backs positioning) effectively, while those open lines can then quickly be used for a through ball, either directly or via an up-back through connection. This is truer against man-oriented opposition who leave central spaces more open by virtue of having positioning dictated by Hibs players, and where the dynamic superiority can be better achieved by exploiting the opposition conferred initiative – (opposition) track, beat (dribble or pass and go) and play through, the second step can frequently be skipped when the ball carrier isn’t pressured intensely, but the opponent remain tight.
One thing I liked about the 3-4-3 particularly with Jaspers dribbling was the rotational dynamic fostered as he moved into the vacated space by the overlapping midfield player to access the far-sided space. The issue in this example once again is where is the far-sided support, there weren’t enough players access to support the transition and effectively infiltrate whilst holding width to progress and stretch the pitch. There is little point having a sequences which can create space if the subsequent players aren’t available to exploit the conditions – emphasis because it encapsulates a lot of my frustration, as there were really positive elements with regards to create space in the naturally formed wide diamonds in a 3-4-3, with a willingness to move into space and rotate within the shape to disrupt marking structures, which is why I was overall, pro Maloney.
Harry Clarke’s feature at right-wing back has been interesting for highlighting the centralising value attained by having a ‘wrong-footed’ player there, perhaps most prominently by his direct in-field run against Hearts. His ‘weak-footed’ positioning means the ball trajectory curls into the runner’s path, a type of pass more difficult on the strong side because the touchline limits space to curl. This moreover provides direct access to the half-space, demonstrating its value in the league game against Hearts (albeit in more transitional circumstances following an opposition corner) where the ball could be centralised and moved directly into the half-space. This is of particular pertinence given Hibs often double or triple wide set-up on the flanks, where there can be higher width from the winger, drifting midfielder (if playing a midfield 3 – typically from GK scenarios) – a left footed player as wide plays the ball frequently into the path of the runner rather than inside. This may be a tad gimmicky because it relies on lack of opposition preparation against a touch-back and central move, but presuming intense pressure, curtailing the out-to-in run can be difficult thus benefitting the change in direction (backwards into space), whilst the one-two – with the wider player nevertheless remains an option should the centralising route be prioritised. The other benefit for accessing stretched space is the potential for automatised hoofs, where the wing-back swings his pass towards the centre, seemingly uncontrolled and lacking awareness, but where knowledge of available space due to teammate movement is known prior (often a dropping forward in between the 2nd and 3rd lines – see the example here for more detail The Ashley Young Special. The make-shift nature of this alteration makes me inclined to say this paragraph is peripheral and speculative at best, nevertheless the potential for wrong-side wingback exploitation in horizontally stretching teams as an option is a worthwhile consideration, highlighted for Scottish fans Brice Wembangomo. More concretely when analysing the playstyle of Malony, it has demonstrated the idea of using wide areas to get around opposition compactness, and bait man-oriented pressure to a flank while subsequently looking to centrally infiltrate. Issues have arisen, particularly with midfield ball reception, often lacking the openness of body to directly and fluidly access the space which links to the connecting links issues failing to exploit of the extent of opposition commitment to the ball side; nevertheless, it displays a committal (in that it is difficult to transition away from) to break through teams which seeks to use the full extents of the pitch.
Ewan Henderson seemed best adapted to performing the diagonals necessary to exploit the overload to isolate circumstance in lieu of connections and overall stands as a good example of recruitment under Maloney, with Rocky and Mitchell being specialised profiles for the playing style; an aggressive and assured defender, albeit recovering from lacking playing time which often lead to dwelling and slow actions which deceptively undermined his technical qualities and an ambitious wing-back with a disposition and capacity to drive down a flank and dominate it, though he does have defensive deficiencies which moreover plays into the specialisation argument. Mitchell’s defensive issues are potentially a reason behind the more cautious approach adopted by Malony defensively, with Clarke coming in as an athletic and combative profile down the left aiding in high pressing efforts, maybe highlighting a need for a reoriented focus, with a defensively robust player being crucial to sustaining pressure by killing the out-ball of the wide players, as being isolated on the flank oftentimes with the covering centre-back behind them, getting out to and pressing the full back pass is critical. Young Elias Melkersen, while not fitting the profile requirements as precisely moreover seems a fantastic find, with potential to develop, and an already established predatory style of movement which makes him constantly dangerous – something I intended to do is examine the use of this profile in a more possession-based system, which means short-term he potentially lacked the capacities for Maloney, but long-term (as you should be thinking with a 19 year-old) could have been a great fit.
Hibs moreover frequently displayed good patience in possession, when granted time, space, and the numerical superiority. The centre backs seem comfortable passing it laterally and gradually progressing to provoke the opposition into worse spatial coverage rather than rushing the ball forward – methodologically moving sequence by sequence, finding the free man as they progress up the pitch and open new passing angles, and whilst wide progression from the wide-centre back widening remain the main avenue of this new angle creation, as mentioned, when direct half-space passes to the forwards are available, they are played, provided the dropping player has midfield support or space to move into. There was a willingness to add depth from centre, centre back and the composure of Ryan Porteous aided in the possession style. They displayed a willingness against more passive teams to attempt pressure passes which seek to create detachment in between the lines, through using seemingly weak, lateral passes to send a signal to the opposition to press, exploiting their triggers to play in between the lines.
An issue however can arise against teams which pressure higher, and the wide centre backs lack the space to infiltrate out-wide while the wingbacks are postionally detached because goalkeeper Macey is unassured in possession and can often falter under the slightest pressure which prevents effective building as the security pass to reset and reposition practically guarantees a long-ball. This has undermined a lot of what has been attempted, as the defence rarely look to reconfigure and build again, preventing more sustained periods of possession, and allowing opposition pressing triggers to be more effective as the security option is cut, as following the pressure from the centre back to goalkeeper essentailly guarantees an often-wayward long ball. This makes Hibs more susceptible to playing out against pressure, which limits the extents they can manufacture the deep transitions out wide which they seek to create, in addition to the extent they can control games, as there is a clearly exploitable weakness to force a turnover. This lack of ability to control the ball through poor goalkeeper possession, combined with poor and risk averse final third play generates a circumstance where Hibs lack the incisiveness of possession to have so little. The security of being able to go backwards and reset outwith other advantages deepening play allows possession-based sides to try more transitional breakthroughs while nevertheless maintaining control overall working under the notion of having an exit which can justify loosening connections to infiltrate forward, such as through deeper wide-build up which seeks to generate a lack of compactness and if tracked diligently by the opposition can have progression potential negated. Without being unrealistic by bringing sides such as Manchester City into the equation but rather using the optimum to demonstrate the underlying benefits – when they fail to breakthrough, have looser connections and need to reconsolidate following a failed riskier progression, the back pass is always on and safe – this creates control and willingness to take risks. This was not present at Hibs, and the Manchester City example potentially overemphasises the level of quality required of a keeper, with Ederson being an anomaly. Composure to hold the ball and play short is as, if not more important than technique once a base level of competence has been reached, although the two will be somewhat correlated, and without being overly hyperbolic, I think Maloney would have been much more successful at Hibs should he have had a goalkeeper capable of acting as a security pass, because that provides the launching pads for risks within a possession-based set-up. It would not resolve issues in completing sequences in the final third, but it would have made the occurrences of said dangerous sequences more common.
When challenged with a team who is adept at shuttling to adjust for horizontal ball circulation, provoking the press may come in the form of disrupting the opposition’s vertical compactness. Going backwards to go forward and creating transitional circumstances which seek to generate space in between the oppositions 2nd and 3rd lines is a tool used by many possession-based teams, and one Hibs lacked because the goalkeeper was not a suitable security. In addition to the broadly application benefit of depth decreasing compactness if followed abstractly, moving backwards can moreover disrupt the distances between the opposition forwards and midfield, as coordination differs, particularly as intensity is emphasised more so from the forward line to apply pressure directly onto the ball to create technical inaccuracy, and thus the potential for a turnover, where 2nd ball opportunities allow the opposition to exploit the vicissitudes of verticality - see Hearts 13:40 for a greater example of Rocky evading pressure and turning back to expose the greater space in between the lines caused by initiating Hearts higher pressure creating a good transitions – difficult to craft situations where a centre back can turn an attacker and directly attack space versus a pass back to a keeper however. Macey therefore negates press-baiting and more vertical build-up potential because he makes the risks not worth taking, effecting the cost-benefit analysis. Focusing so much on the detrimental impact of one player is not something I like doing; however, the importance of composure and technical security at the back is something I do not want to underemphasise, particularly as it pertains to why Maloney struggled, as the style of play was directly undermined.
The more directly alterable part of Hibs risk aversion was pressing intensity, willingness to commit in higher areas. The adaptions against Hearts in the final two games filled me confidence because it demonstrated a greater commitment to control games and adapt around the lack of goals and direct threat through producing turnovers, having the ball more to compensate for lost deep possessions and prevent the opposition from scoring, as stability is the ball when practiced correctly. This primarily manifested in adopting a greater degree of man-orientation (crucially rather than marking rigidly) and trusting the three centre backs in their duels to sustain pressure and prevent breakthroughs into exposed now uncovered space.
The most crucial part of all however was reduction of opposition control as high pressing allows for worsening long ball conditions through reducing the time and space the passer has in addition to being able to piston them postionally to move and receive in the first place. When situated in the context of the SPFL, lack of opposition passing support structure reduces the importance of compactness in higher regions as they are predicated on going long and hence prepare accordingly, rather than having mechanisms to exploit growing spaces in between the lines. The aim is to create accuracy and reduced oppositional control via ball pressure. High compactness in combination with high coverage is needed against teams which play out high, not that go long. Moreover, the compensatory tool of centre back man-orientation suites Hibs centre backs like Doig, Porteous and Rocky. I want to avoid slightly the characterisation that back threes permit centre back freedom from higher pressing situations (particular those which fit into a more structured mould such as a pistoned touchline press) as too much emphasis is placed on nominal positions, with a back four being capable of ball sided man-orientation with the centre back pushing aggressively in the half-space to support the full back because the far-sided full back can tuck in forming in essence a back three with similar chain links meaning much of the logic from consolidated defensive situations can apply (transitional defending alterations considerations slightly because of alternate rest-defence shape). Tangent aside nevertheless, from less consolidated circumstances, the back three structure does allow for more optimal player profile positioning in aggressive pressing, particularly when sustaining pressure in higher regions, with Milan Škriniar being the model in Antonio Conte’s Inter side, and a player I think many defenders, but notably as it pertains to Hibs Ryan Porteous could learn from. Therefore, the overall aim of the higher pressing approach is to create conditions that are more unusual for the opponent and less controlled circumstances upon initial reception – this is aided by many Scottish teams, notably Hearts in this example lacking a short support structure when facing higher pressure and often going long, often in an uncontrolled manner (vs controlled from set-piece circumstances, where altering opposition possession conditions is impossible).
From the start at Tynecastle Hibs man-oriented in their pressing structure, matching the back three, granting them little time in possession after reception. The wingbacks would jump high on support, while there to some degree an effort to block wider passes to constrain Hearts in the centre. The overarching theme of limiting time on the ball to prevent accuracy in long balls was evident. The wing-back engagement in higher pressing is what struck me as most important and revelatory as Maloney tenure progressed and showed a greater towards taking the game to the opposition, negating their game proactively in a way which simultaneously helped the overarching goals of Hibs, rather than just direct negation.
(Apologies for the screenshot which makes it difficult to decipher context)
This was the previous game against Dundee United, and it had me questioning why Rocky doesn’t step out to aid Cadden, the reasoning is structural rather than individual, but the player in possession lacks support whilst Cadden is behind play meaning recovering will likely manifest in a foul. To sustain pressure, encouraging defenders to step up in these regions is the benefit you get from a back three rest structure. I feel this emblemises what I diagnose as Maloney’s primary issue at Hibs, and what was being somewhat rectified in the games against Hearts which sacrificing macrocosmic aims in favour of minimising microcosmic risk. The example of this concept practically is a low block, which in the situation of defending minimises potential risk when the question asked is, how to negate the possibility of a goal being scored directly in this particular sequence. While a macrocosmic consideration takes into account not only possible counter-attacking opportunities but broader themes like control and minimisation of the opponent reaching dangerous circumstances, which I feel is best characterised by Pep’s ‘stability is the ball’. That is not to suggest a deep block is never the best strategy or that possession-based football is the only approach (I love Antonio Conte and think his football is very effective!).
The Hearts games are moreover interesting when examining the increased role of centre backs in isolated duels and dealing with controlled long-balls as Ellis Simms specialises in well-rounded back to goal play which allows him to be a threat facing in both directions, and a general nuisance in more chaotic situations created by long-balls, being combative and suited to attacking space. Limiting the accuracy he could be hit with was crucial – and considering Hearts planned around this when structuring themselves at the back, committing to man-oriented pressure to limit time for the ball carriers to generate inaccuracy made a lot of sense (and is logic which can be applied to many teams in the SPFL).
The semi-final demonstrated a ludicrous commitment to left-sided asymmetry when building upon, with many automatised patterns such as attempting to pass to the dropping half-space player from wide-CB. There was a greater commitment towards attempting to make these routines work, and training on the directly was evident.
The best example of this overloading automatised commitment came in the 10th minute of the semi-final where there was a triple-wide set-up which drew markers, accordingly, opening the diagonal into the half-space for the midfielder to drop into whilst the high width subsequently came inside to open space for the second wide player to rush onto. It also drew attention to another aspect commonly repeated which was the double wide 1-2 where the initial passer would move into the channel after passing, something which again looked automated due to the fluidity of movement and understanding in addition to the consistency with which it was attempted (it was repeated 2 minutes later on the opposite flank for example).
It was elements like these in wide build-up which generated a lot of hope and faith in Maloney, because these sequences were extremely well coached. However, being effective at space creation is only half of the solution, the other half entails exploiting the transitional circumstances created and Hibs often faltered because of the repeated reasons of positional imbalance with regards to half-space connections and placing too much emphasis on crossing with regards to chance creation, partially because they lacked the balanced recycling structure necessary to find an opening in advanced areas.
Would I have sacked Maloney? The answer is no, particularly after two impressive and positive performances against Hearts where the playstyle was much more protagonistic, especially off the ball. The players continued to show intensity and tactical adaptations were occurring such as the hybrid-ish four adopted in the semis. The marked improvement when Maloney was willing to take greater risks showed me greater potential, even if issues remained. Whether they would have been resolved is unknown, my inclination would be that Hibs would not have been overloading to isolate like a Conte team, nor recycling possession patiently like a Guardiola team in the final third; but there would have been improvements particularly with a preseason, although to really ascertain anything outside baseless speculation would require a direct conversation with the man himself and his diagnostics. I feel keeping him until the end of the season to see if Hearts like performances continued would have been the prudent course of action, and then evaluate thereafter. Analysing Hibs has been an interesting experience for me personally and has brought to life many what people consider overly abstract quotes by people such as Juanma Lillo, while also reminding me that space creation is not everything. I think the risk aversion in particular will be an especially important learning aspect for Maloney personally and would anticipate a greater readiness to impart a more progressive vision from the off. Optimism frequently requires believing the unknown, and I still think he can work on deficiencies and establish himself as a good manager. To say his time at Hibs was successful would be disingenuous; however, he showed a lot of potential despite the results and clearly has good tactical understanding, and it would be a shame if he did not step back into management, even after a potential hiatus moving back to coaching initially.