Build-up - 3-1:
When facing low intensity pressure against the defensive line, use wall passes through the DM, acting as a circulatory player to generate time for the far-side CB. Against low intensity pressure, centre back ball progression is encouraged via the tucking in of Tyrell Malacia. Tucking in allows the stucture to widen generating better connections to the flanks while adding the element of diagonality present from half space occupation, and these benefits are felt through the greater freedom to engage and provoke the opposition. Connecting wide provides an out-to-in connection between the lines as passing lanes are circumvented via the wide pass left accessible through the opponent’s commitment to compactness, as the horizontal rather than vertical access route is used. While the closing off distances via progression permits better play in between the lines as there is less of an opportunity to pre-emptively intercept or jump as ball travel time is reduced. Oftentimes the result would be more banal as Palace shuttled whereby a pass would go to the higher wide player, angles for progression would be cut off, play would move backwards to the centre back in more space now due to the provoked compaction, would then seeks to access the far-side.
In these phases there was a willingness to trust players in between the lines when linking up tightly which suites the skillsets of the players. Antony Martial has displaced a particular proficiency in this regard, with great close control and the frame to hold himself up against defenders when awaiting support. This type of play is predicted on quick movement of possession to use whatever dynamic superiority exists to find gaps in the opposing defence, using the pass in between the lines a trigger to compact. Close control becomes pertinent to buy seconds against potentially exploitable intensity in seeking a turnover. Centre back dominance important in this regard, as the compaction often results in an uncontrolled clearance, where to sustain pressure, the centre back needs to be capable against the opponents forward – Maguire was particularly important in this regard, and because we lack an alternate option profile wise, is potentially indispensable when fit.
There is additionally a desire to go more direct created by the stucture which places 6 potential runners on the last line, which horizontally stretched often must sacrifice wide coverage, making Rashford (almost exclusively on the left), and Dalot (typically) outlets for reception, where upon receiving they would look to quickly link up via the attackers continuing their runs through underlaps.
Building the CB’s time and space in possession was an important aspect of facilitating this, achieved through Fred’s circulation , who would often rotate to draw a play and create space for the centre back to progress before launching it forward. Bait them forward through Fred wall passes, use contrasting directions to pull the Palace players away and attack space. Similar applications of the principle could be seen through Lindelof often moving in between the lines rather than remaining lateral to Maguire - bait, entice then use the initiative to attack space in between the lines.
This underlines the most important aspect of the 3-1 set-up with aggressively positioned ‘wide centre backs. Aggressive IBTL occupation provides good opportunity for link-up following ball progression by allowing a midfield underlap and nearby support from the aggressive wide-CB upon progression or some permutation such as progression to CM, to winger followed by an underlap from the aggressive CB. Possible in other set-ups such as double inverted full back 4-1 variants, but greater IBTL occupation stretches defences to a greater extent increasing the efficacy of the progression with the trade-off being less secure ball circulation – against a passive press, this can be a worthwhile trade-off because it better sets you up for transitioning offensively, while only sacrificing a low percentage in security – the marginal returns for security are outweighed by transition potential, potentially. Less secure build-up may additionally be more provocatory, serving to increase the chance of transition. It appears Ten Hag has identified strong tight link-up and on ball chemistry to react to evolving circumstances to be a strength of this team. The attackers can capitalise on opposition compaction attempts by finding little bits of space to exploit which makes central progression more likely. Difficult to provide a codified blueprint to success which is legible, based more on the attacking players capacity to connect upon the initial progression and thus their positioning and instructions on what type of supporting runs to make. There are more hard-coded aspects such as Martial dropping and Bruno running; however, in between the lines compact progression is very complex and unpredictable and requires improvisation which plays into the strengths of good tight link up (Martial and Sancho esp.) and chemistry which exists. Not ‘vibes’ as how the in between the lines progression is achieved through more consolidated build-up routines, and the supporting stucture when play is legible is pertinent – its about placing the attackers in optimal positions to capitalise on the transition, wherein the chaotic conditions require spontaneity. Predictable results such as progression via underlap stem, where planning becomes more important to provide a supporting structure to the wide player. Central progression is more transition due to the opponents-maintained compactness, or if central lines are breached, a potential goalscoring opportunity is instantly created.
This reasoning should provide a degree of reticence on going overboard with praise against a weakened Crystal Palace side, less attuned and proficient in their sides pressing, whilst the qualitative difference is paramount when talking about slight advantages in time and space when it comes to beating defenders and finding gaps. While the signs are positive, the lack of legibility this sort of attacking comes with should generate scepticism regarding its direct transferal to facing Premier League teams. This is not to denigrate, nor diminish. You can only beat whats put in front of you, and United under ten Hag have done so ably, it should just be considered when considering degrees of uncertainty – possession play has looked overwhelming positive which should adjust expectations regarding potential, reducing uncertainty; but nevertheless, uncertainty should remain. We have already shown a capability of tight link-up which has not been seen in over a year, which indicates massive improvement as is, the conclusion from this game is positive, just hedged.
Looping back to the emphasis on aggressive CBs in the 3-1 – they occupy an ideal position to underlap upon deciding the side of progression, but particularly on the far-side where you are transitioning into more space – first goal game from Maguire progressing confidently and playing a crisp switch – Sancho looking extremely comfortable coming inside from the left. A lot of players forward after failed initial breakthrough has a pinning effect and benefits so-called contingency factors created by the bounce of the ball through having numbers surrounding the ball – both full backs used their weak-foot executing a switch and cross respectively – great asset to have with regards to making attacks more dynamic and difficult to defend.
When Palace were settled in their block, there was a common vertical rotation between full back and winger. FB sits in between the lines; winger comes deeper to receive. If tracked, this has the potential to open the potential for a more direct ball into the vacated channel – rare because it is Dalot being the 3rd ‘CB’ but shows Rashford maintaining width, while with Dalot and Sancho, occupation of interiour space and wide was more flexible.
29th min:
Aggressive central CB progression moreover can be valuable in creating separation for Fred to receive by provoking the proximity of the marking player – permitting a route to the winger which is less conducive towards the shuttling of a block through committing a winger and more aligned with generating a 1v1 – nevertheless, the commanding voice of Erik ten Hag can be heard saying “switch” and “other side” – the opponent successfully shuttles and compacts on the ball-side requiring the movement of the ball to access space and create gaps through moving the block.
In these phases the importance of Martial’s dropping to provide connections cannot be understated, without him and his more complete skillset, I think the team struggles to look as fluid. To highlight this fluidity, consider a team where from open play, a centre back advancing is parallel with a dropping centre forward is one I want to see – vertical fluidity to manipulate defensive structures and advance through using dynamic superiorities.
Superficial but symbolic:
Dynamic use and occupation of space, using 1-2 movements and having corresponding rotations is critical to how we have looked to progress the ball in the 3-1 stucture. Wide outlet it is an underlap rotation to create space and gain territory.
50th min – wall passes between Fred and Lindelof triggers Martial dropping to form a diamond, exploiting the central space created by Palace coverage of the duelling wide options. Fred drops and spring – carrying movement forward dynamically to exploit space opened via up-passing angles. There is a desire to provoke the opposition forward to generate space for link-up in between the lines through ball recycling; however this process moreover creates the alternative in a diagonal to the opposition flank or potential near-sided ball progression via an underlap.
It should be noted emphasis on dynamic movement from deeper regions can lead to greater exposure in defensive transition as losing the ball when connecting, or the commitment required when interchanging can leave voids defensively. This is a trade-off rather than a weakness abstractly – by encouraging fluidity in these areas you leave yourself more susceptible if a turnover occurs. Thus, far it seems to be working and the players are connecting well, the opponent stepping must moreover take a risk of additional exposure, so the risk is not one-way either.
Deeper build-up:
Single pivot used when building deep against Palace’s man-oriented press. Near-side full back widens and deepens while the far-side narrows. 4-1 stucture from deeper areas such as goal kicks before a ball-side is committed – full backs position themselves relatively narrow from base positions and tilt like a steering wheel depending on ball positioning typically, although can narrow at the ball side, provided the near-sided midfielder can perform a horizontal rotation.
14th minute demonstrates a potential pattern – draw the near-sided press forward and trigger their ball-sided man-orientation when the far-side winger goes onto the far-side CB (common pressing scheme) and use the goalkeeper to switch play to the know isolated far-side full back. Potential to be jumped by opposing full-back triggered possible and a room for opposition exploitation if the ball is too weakly weighted as to increase travel, and thus opposition adaptation time. De Gea’s desire to distribute to the flanks makes me think this is a potential contingency, but the jumping potential makes me wary of saying anything concreate.
Interestingly here Dalot inverts and McTominay widens, which can be viewed discombobulating as a rotation, as many teams press is predicated on cutting the passing lane to the full-back via a narrow winger whilst tracking dropping CM’s in a man-oriented fashion. The horizontal rotation allows Dalot to exploit being on the wingers blind-side to buy time, creating a temporary 2v1 for the supposed to be man-oriented midfielder, undermining the basis of the scheme temporarily. Man-oriented schemes this may require the tracking of both, which confers a greater dynamic superiority onto the now centralised full back, who can turn inside and centrally because of the adapting wingers body orientation. Man-oriented pressing is predicted on forcing backwards reception to compact the pitch by limiting the progressive angles of the receiving player, by changing the body orientation to sideways, it has the reverse effect of showing the receiving player forward into space. Far-side FB narrows to provide a safe connection, with the emphasis on far-side width being placed on the winger correspondingly.
Note the positioning from Malacia – superfluous being wide as he is inaccessible, better to become a direct passing option which can connect to the far-side – centralising stretches more insofar as it provides a connecting link to allow for transitions.
Here however, Lindelof pass to Maguire triggers McTominay deeper to support because Palace initiating pressure dictates that it is the ball-side – provides the possibility for an up-across principle frequently seen under ten Hag, using the tightly marked midfielder to circumvent the wingers cover shadow (circumstances dictate Fred does it this time, but the principle applies nevertheless as he drops to support). With regards to body orientation centrally, there isn’t much more the defensive side can do. The Palace winger’s commitment and the high positioning of the Manchester United winger prevents the FB from jumping whilst the United FB has free reception. Common principle used throughout bypassing pressure, use the man-orientation as a tool to angle the body and exploit the lack of pitch coverage which results, undermine its basis through using numerical superiority, exploiting the wingers initial cover shadow. 6(+1) v5. The overarching aim is to use vertical passes to bypass in to out pressure to access wide regions.
2nd goal:
Came from working backwards responding to pressure rather than rushing forward. General principle of the potential of going backwards to then again go forwards to exploit the opponent’s forward orientation and overzealous commitment, using the vertically stretched conditions to transition into.
De Gea switch to wide areas in action again – Bruno covering in wide regions to receive. Demonstrates the double wide concept where the tracking entails centrally exploitable space, meaning the initial wide commitment is liberating rather than constraining as access to the centre is more readily accessible, thus needing covered, allowing Bruno to stay back to generate space to play the direct ball. Lovely touch by Martial, good delay and choice of incision from Sancho from a Donny overlap. Much more composed play than seen in previous seasons building up. Potentially made the move sound more codified than it was – seems as though de Gea prefers distributing into space rather than precisely which allows Bruno to adapt his positioning accordingly, then work around the circumstances presented – spontaneous factors such as detachment created by Malacia’s deep narrow positioning drawing the full back forward.
Still overarching issue of playing against a poor Palace side where the qualitative element can undermine the significance of tactics, particularly when discussing the importance of contesting for particular duels, but even regarding the capacity of defenders to close off particular passing angles, when to close down, how much confidence they have in their teammates in a match setting, pressing intensity and technical defending skills etc., impressive, although I imagine a Premier League level opposition would be better defensively drilled as to not be so easily enticed backwards, allowing themselves to be stretched. I say that but is potentially a contingency (for Palace) when chasing a game, and the requirement to kill of stretched opponents on the counter is a pertinent one – so an important asset to have in the locker.
3rd goal:
Great composure from Lindelof to entice through delaying – able to fluidly change directions to receive – something I think Maguire contrastingly would struggle with. Good spatial awareness from both Fred and Lindelof – Fred to not continue dropping deep to compact but rather placing himself for a forward pass in between the lines, and Lindelof’s recognition of that pass being viable.
Use of dynamic movement into space for the transition to receive – space in between the 2nd and 3rd lines confers the dynamic advantage onto the attackers, constantly ahead of their markers with space to move into both backwards and forwards.
Typical Sancho disguise with the finish.
Higher pressure:
High pressing ball-sided man-oriented 4-2-3-1, CF initiates pressure – Narrow wingers until commitment – freedom given to bait FB pass if higher, far-side winger goes into proximity with far-side CB, AM on 6 – near-side players get tight on supporting options to suffocate and isolate FB. DM moves to become free to fight for predictable 2nd balls created by direct ball forced by isolation, opposition far-side CM left free – better ‘rest-attack’ positioning in that it provides a free pass and a link to transition. Dynamic far-side half-space movement from narrow FB important in catalysing transition as coming from deep uncovered, they have the dynamic advantage over whomever picks them up – functions like an aggressive CB (distinction for all intents and purposes aren’t important in possession).
Wasn’t really tested because of Palace poor build-up; however, the players performed their roles well – it was coordinated with good intensity, with ball recoveries happening frequently upon isolating the winger.
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