Automatism watch: Kulusevski’s goal - Tottenham vs Manchester City
4-2-4 ❤️⚽️.
From a goal kick situation, Tottenham horizontally and vertically stretch through having a deep back 4 cover the full extent of the pitch. Bernando presses in a way as to block access to the goalkeeper and the lateral pass to the centre back, attempting to craft Romero’s options for him. The deep two as with other 4-2 deep build-up variants seeks to maximise space in between the 2nd and 3rd lines for forwards to receive with the dynamic superiority – generating space to be dropped into and subsequently creating vacated space be exploited due to defensive discombobulation as runs are tracked. If runs are not tracked in a man-oriented manner, the player receiving can collect freely, turn, and access the vast amounts of space for runners which they are likely to exploit because of increased technical accuracy caused by the lack of pressure. Thus, tracking in a man-oriented manner to limit effective time and space microcosmically and reduce potential for instant progressive actions is often worth the trade-off for worse nominal spatial coverage, as an unpressured attacker in between the lines running at a defence is often able to access more ‘effective space’ despite the better nominal coverage.
City are ball-sided in their initial set-up which furthers the argument towards their predominant ‘passing-lane’ orientation as all passing options bar the two far sided players are cut. Defending is more complex and greyscale than the reducible taglines of man, zonal, ball passing-lane etc., as these reference points are used throughout, such as far-sided winger using Raheem Sterling using far-sided but centralised pivot Pierre-Emile Højbjerg as his primary orientation point which is nevertheless predicated on his teammates, thier desire to maintain compactness, the space, what is and isn’t accessible (influenced by compactness, (which is influenced by teammates)), in this instance the far-side switch is left accessible. The ball is important insofar as that dictates ball-sidedness and what Sterling should be using as a reference point, in addition to the positioning of his teammates (and where to compact around because the ball positioning creates greater or worse accessibility due to travel times and difficulties with accuracy under pressure). That potentially obfuscatory spiel is attempting to reveal that defending is complex, particularly when attempting to codify because of the multivariable considerations and how they interact with each other. Nevertheless, In 2012 (» Counterpressing variations (spielverlagerung.com)), René Marić aptly described then Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona as passing lane oriented in their counterpressing which in essence is predicted on leading the ball carrier down a suboptimal path through limiting options via cutting of passing lanes which oftentimes requires positioning ahead of potential markers, rather than engaging in duels – guiding accessible space through moving towards the ball carrier and shaping yourself to create their options. I think this overall characterisation applies to his Manchester City side, in this regard to their consolidated pressing rather than counterpressing.
The question then arises as to why this pathway, seemingly deliberately crafted by City’s defending (the best team in the world) was exploitable.
For City I think the issue was lack of pressure on the ball combined with ball-sidedness which created the pathway for the switch as designed but didn’t have the appropriate covering mechanisms, nor the pressure required to force an inaccurate ball. Cristian Romero was able to spray the pass leisurely to Ben Davies who could receive unpressured. They were able to overload then cleanly isolate. That however does not explain why Spurs subsequent exploitation was effective.
From Spurs perspective I think an important aspect was the deeper positioning of Sessegnon relative to Kulusevski on the opposition flank, which drew Kyle Walker deeper and thus reduced City’s last line defensive coverage making balls in behind more difficult as Walker vacated deep space on the last line for Son to run into. It initially appeared as if both players were dropping deep to support the ball carrier, which would have made City’s pressing easier as the backwards orientation compacts play. However, Son’s dynamic countermovement pounced upon that potential conception and the reactivity of man-orientation, which as mentioned is often required when covering large areas of space in between the lines. Automatisms are predicated on superior knowledge, where understanding the purpose of a particular action in microcosm is difficult, as it is part of a holistic scheme to manufacture and exploit space. This superior knowledge permits increased reaction time due to reduced speed of thought, granting the dynamic superiority further, as the team in possession are aware of their pathway compared to the reactive opponent and therefore are often 1 or 2 steps ahead.
Son Heung-min enacts a very sophisticated 3rd man run, dropping deeper, feigning to look to receive and is tracked by Rodri when his movement curves into a forward run where he can use the deeper start to generate momentum in anticipation the expected future action by Kane – this creates a dynamic superiority in contrast to Dias, who is more static and has orientation initially towards the ball requiring pivoting run into the space contrasted to Son’s fluid run which sets him up directionally. Rodri’s space vacation opens the passing lane to Kane, who, dropping into space can turn and execute the through pass to Son without scanning ahead because he is already aware that his deeper countermovement implied a run into space.
As seen at Inter with many automatisms predicated on exploiting Lukaku’s qualitative superiority in hold-up and Hakimi’s qualitative edge running in behind into space, here at Spurs Conte similarly seeks to maximise the skillset of his players, adding an automatised edge to the all-to-familiar Kane x Son routine which exploits the formers passing range and the latter’s movement and composure in front of goal.
Semantically, I would still consider this routine to be 4-2-4 because of the principles of vertical and horizontal stretching, with the deeper positioning of Emerson still placing him above the midfield line and in between the 2nd and 3rd lines, with staggering being a regular part of normal offensive play in the first line in a vertically fluid set-up. I think Conte would agree – regardless its semantics, both Conte, and I as a disciple, like the principles and underlying mechanisms we associate with the term 4-2-4, which were on display here. And these underlying interiour associated conceptions are what is important, and what makes a 4-2-4 a 4-2-4 ❤️⚽️.
Additional Automatised Fun
It is worth noting that Spurs second goal moreover came from a 4-2-4 sequence – this one predicated on near-side advancement before overloading to isolate the far-sided wing-back charging forward to create the shape.
Romero similarly receives from Lloris, far-side pivot Højbjerg comes short calling for possession creating the ball-sided imbalance and Bentancur only slightly adjusts centrally. Højbjerg then completes the diamond shape with Kulusevski and Emerson, free to receive out wide. Romero uses an up-back sequence to exploit the commitment of ball-sided Sterling, covers the initial passing lane preventing the wide-ball but through pressing decreases his proximity to Emerson, granting the right back greater freedom once the passing-lane cutting had been undermined via Kulusevski.
Here they demonstrate the symbiotic relationship between horizontal and vertical stretching, as the horizontal stretching opens the passing lanes to channels to allow for vertical progression. This effect can manifest alternatively under higher pressure where the greater distance between the vertical lines better facilitates an inwards diagonal pass from the flank, undermining the constraining effect of the touchline looking to be used by the pressing team.
Kane drops as the ball-sided forward to receive, attempting a pass into space on Son who is being compacted on by Walker and Dias. This produces poor coverage and thus Sessegnon can freely win the second ball. Ascertaining whether this was planned is difficult; however, I hedge on the side it was because should Walker not compact, Kane can hit the ball further into space for Son to chase, leaving him either isolated with Dias and with the potential to cross, or if Walker then converges a potential backwards option Sessegnon. If Walker does coverage, then the situation which played out in reality occurs where the second ball is easily winnable.