Preface: Taken a slightly odd approach towards writing this, using bullet points because there are few natural prose links which can capture the individuality and simultaneous interconnectedness of defensive stucture. The aim is to connect the individual sequences through a natural flow created through the ordering of the bullet points: whether I achieved that or not is a different question.
· In the mid-block initially, central space is prioritised as expected, whilst Harry Kane sits on the defensive midfielder: This seeks to make the game more directional by forcing a ball-side, while it passively allows possession to be held by the opposing centre backs.
· If a player moves into the deep half-space, potentially to create a back 3, stretching the lines and establishing a more secure connection to a full back, now permitted to push up higher, the near-side central midfielder is responsible for pushing up, while blocking the vertical passing lane with his cover shadow. This plays into the directionality aspect, as the opponent in this circumstance want to counteract the marking through having a deep half-space presence which grants better access to the pitch, and thus why they are pressed.
The creation of a 3 however is not necessary for the centre midfielder to engage as a progressing centre back in a two can moreover be pressed after advancement to similar areas (arguably the creation of the 3 ensues with the far-side full back tucking in here) but generally the position on the pitch is what is of pertinence to press; to prevent the player finding a pass in behind or provoking the proximity himself which would strengthen connections to nearby players. This pressing maintains a distance and cuts off passing links in between the lines.
· The near-side central midfielder engaging allows the winger to maintain good proximity to the full back, functionally shutting down progression and forcing backwards recycling as they can quickly shuttle while wide linking is blocked by the winger-back and the width of play, compactness, man-oriented CB and in-to-out body orientation of the winger blocks half-space access.
· This backwards recycling seeks to access the under covered far-side, with the far-sided full back being the only player. This process can generally happen quite fluidly because of the lack of pressure applied to the last line of defence, which is one of the comparative disadvantages compared to a 5-3-2 used by Conte at Inter, which allows more pressure to be applied by the far-side forward in switch situations (this is when a higher press cannot be triggered, The near-sided midfielder uses the backwards recycling as a trigger to reinitiate stepping up in most circumstances).
· Contrastingly to the 5-3-2 however, the contingencies for a successful switch are better in place due to the positioning of the far-sided midfielder.
· If the opponent successfully switches play and generate an isolated attacker/full back progressing situation, the now near-side wing back delays until support arrives, allowing the ball carrier to progress and avoiding a duel.
· Extrapolated holistically, the wing-back caught in a transitional circumstance, either through counterattacks or a sufficiently fluid switch which allows the then far-side winger to attack space does not jump in a reactionary fashion to engage early. Rather, when shifting, the wing-back remains compact in dealing with the direct threat and closing off dribbling routes to the deeper half-spaces, attempting to block connection attempts and show play out-wide, waiting for support to arrive before doubling up and consolidating, or forcing a risky finalising action such as a cross, or taking on players centrally, with the near-side CB stepping out.
· When the winger recovers, the process of doubling up begins whereby the two defensive players remain in close proximity and make progression impossible through the winger blocking the half-space and wing-back watching the flank. This level of proximity when doubling and the consistency which it is done is almost unparalleled (hedging, because I can’t think of any examples, though they may and most probably exist), as they are frequently no more than 2/3 yards apart.
· This aims to create the predictable response of backwards recycling, which subsequently triggers the near-side CM to push forward onto the half-space player (as in mid-block phases), who then must either move it side-to-side again or make a decisive action. Thiago switched onto this pattern and deliberately took a heavy touch in anticipation of Bentancur’s pressure following backwards pass from Robertson in advanced area, this beat Bentancur and created an overload were once there was parity. Backwards recovery was achieved; however, Mane smartly moves to create a progression path as Kulu needs to cut inside pass as Romero is occupied by Diaz and Emerson, Robertson. This adaption to the second line of defence being beat stands testament to Spurs compactness, as they were quickly able to reduce the space Thiago had to operate in, closing him down and therefore the overloading options. Essentially, against particularly adept opponents like Thiago, compactness is the contingency.
· This compactness is created by a higher sitting defensive line relative to the low midfield line, which is facilitated by the reactive tracking allowed in addition to the overall depth of play which means central spaces should be covered by Llrois. Pressure on the ball via the midfielders stepping up on proximity-based triggers is moreover important in preventing access in behind.
· In the mid-block phase before possession has progressed to the winger, and the set-up features a near-sided midfielder behind, full back at opposition midfield level and winger wide/in the half-spaces, the wide midfielder takes responsibility for the full back.
· A ball-sided overload here could be imagined where Diaz goes wide, and Mane drops closer to the ball. In this instance, depending on how movements occurred, Romero would be responsible for the half-space, which is functionally flexible as the ball moves over the ball-side (My (developed/misunderstood/misapplied) conception of the 7-zone model – what I am proposing is the half-space as a concept can be fluid and dependant on effective space). Diaz in-to out movements would therefore be tracked by Romero, as to would Mane’s Dier at CCB. Out-to in movements would Emerson on Diaz, then passed onto Romero as the flank needs covered.
· Interestingly, Manchester United’s weird left dominance flummoxed Spurs at times, as although most overloads were under control, the man-oriented element of their defending seemed to be undermined as United achieved the numerical superiority, because the zonal element prevented proportionate support. This worked largely as the overloads were non-threatening and Spurs compactness generally nullified incision. However, it was an intriguing watch, particular as due to this overload, United had no threat from switches in advanced regions. Thus, while flummoxing, it was ineffective, with the bafflement likely coming from the ’irrationality’ of the attacking i.e., this is a bad way to attack, hence preparing our defensive stucture around its nullification is likely counterproductive. (To their credit, United had a decent backwards recycling stucture which helped them sustain pressure by creating depth after advancing with weird left-sided overloads)
· In-to-out man-orientation is crucial to understanding the way Spurs defend with their centre backs, as it forces backwards orientation upon reception which has a compacting effect, reducing the size of the playing field and therefore benefitting the out-of-possession team. This allows for commitment to the ball-side as direct switches are not available while turnovers are likely. This type of defending is what makes back 3’s strong, as zonal-man orientation allows fluid movement in response to the opposition’s ball-sided commitment, undermining attempted overloads through communicative passing-on when overlaps (positional defensively rather than full back round winger) occur in addition to shifting in accordance with the possession teams compaction often caused by runs. Essentailly, all movement is pushed and followed to the flanks, which then pins the receiving player of a ball into space into the flank, thus allowing for compaction, amplified by the instant tightness. This functions under an effective space concept which can be applied microcosmically whereby duels can be isolated to 1v1 in the flanks as the attacker has no viable options, as space has been closed off play one player, not too unlike systematic space elimination via cutting of passing lanes and structural compactness creating traps. This type of defending is risker in a 4 where horizontal last line coverage is poorer, and thus covering opportunities are reduced (nevertheless, principles are adopted in 4’s – Spurs just apply this logic through the game). The rule of thumb is movement inside is passed on, movement outside is followed.
· Man-orientation in this regard is designed to close off and direct effective space, in the example of winger doubled upon, recycling backwards to near-side CM, a predictable chain is created which encourages funnelling and therefore the creation of traps. The CM stepping out to close off progression from the front further continues to dictate accessible space.
· Spurs defenders are therefore very reactive in how they defend, with this reactivity being influenced by the ball, relying on the defender’s anticipation on when to jump when the pass looks on. Too early and space is exposed, and the opponent successfully manipulated space; however, when timed correctly, it has a major compacting effect, in addition to granting them more dynamism to go into a tackle win to produce a turnover.
· In low block phases, the defence is less reactive centrally, I think because of the increased compactness in between the lines leading to a reduced need to compensate in addition to the higher stakes of the opponent getting a split second in higher regions where space is temporarily uncovered due to Spurs reactivity. This can be costly when the near-side midfielder steps up leaving space uncovered, quick link-up occurs whilst the CCB remains positioned in line allowing for a long-shot. A fairly small weakness albeit.
· The near-sided wing back uses the man as a reference point for positioning within reason so superfluous overlaps with the near-side CB are not present. This helps close of channels when there is no direct advanced flank threat – adapting width in response to the oppositions threat, with the defensive line moreover acting accordingly, shuttling in response to opposition movement to maintain compactness. Essentially, if the opponent lacks effective width, the wing-back does not sit out zonally, he compacts accordingly to real, rather than abstract threats.
· The defensive line is therefore zonal-man oriented, with each centre back response for a player in a channel, often pushing out aggressively when they seek to receive. This forces backwards reception, while runs are tracked in the channels if in-to-out infiltration, while out-to-in runs are dealt with by the full back compacting. How space is dealt with depends on the opposition’s coverage of the pitch, and thus who is responsible for where varies as Spurs look to compact the pitch in wide directions but are carefully not overzealous. Therefore, in central areas its often the case that the wide centre backs are responsible for the half-spaces, the centre, centre back the centre forward in the centre and the wing-backs the wingers. Spatial occupation and fluid adaptations once the ball is moving is perhaps the greatest strength of Spurs well-coordinated back 5, as the pressure they apply on the ball when being aggressive generates enough time to reconfigure, while the hard-to-beat block allows for reorganisation following the aggressive defensive pressure.
· Moreover, the full back compacts if movement is followed man-oriented deeper as the man-oriented tracker has more of a ball orientation in forcing possession backwards. This functionally creates a back 4 while the defender is looking to generate a turnover, which expands to a 5 against once he has recovered postionally. Basic rationale of prioritising the centre.
· Here is a what-if they all make movements into the channel example, which while unrealistic, helps exemplify the compacting effect of back to goal in-to-out tracking, whereas out-to-in runs lead to the attacker being on the defenders wrong-side, meaning the ‘passing on’ approach works more, as it allows for a directional shift to in-to-out pressing by reorienting the player responsible. This pertains to runs rather than subtle slow movement, where tracking suffices as tightness can be maintained to the player in question.
· Below is a good example of the wing-back jumping from an initially compact position once the high wide player (Trent) receives possession, whilst Son shuttles to double up, whilst Højbjerg’s higher positioning demonstrates the near-side centre midfielder stepping up. Sessegnon is confident enough to practically bait the underlap from Salah, as the situation frequently leads to pitch compaction and/or a throw-in. Interesting moreover is the contrasting diagonalities of their runs, with Son going inwards to block the centre while Sessegnon engages, again showing play out wide or backwards as both central avenues are cut.
· When dealing with overlaps, the wing-back remains the player who will engage with the ball carrier whilst the winger tracks the player, if (opponent) turning backwards and a (opposition) midfielder supports, this will be followed by the near-side centre back (in accordance with the man-oriented principles, flexible ball-side half space idea of compaction). If a breakthrough occurs with the opponent using momentum to attack the space, the centre centre back will cover, increasing the compaction while decreasing coverage, under the notion of preventing direct threat, and limiting access to the exposed far-side in the short-term from a risk averse perspective, while attempting to win the ball from a proactive one.
· This man-orientation is moreover reactive making it less susceptible to positional manipulation than proactive man-orientation practiced by sides such as Atalanta and Leeds under Bielsa, whilst moreover being predicated on having numerical superiorities to postionally cover through sacrificing territory high up and waiting for support in transitional circumstances.
· In lower and mid-block phases on the far-side after a switch, it is the far-side winger who is responsible for pressuring the deep half-space player, seen notably with Kulusevski on Thiago. This seeks to break the opponent’s half-space connection and force recycling of play to be more U-shaped, slowing down the transition and allowing for adaption. From said recycling, near-side dynamics then apply as the winger shuttles over to close the winger whilst the near-side midfielder has shuttled to be in proximity with the opponents deep half-space player.
· Trusting defenders in duels is a huge part of Spurs game in accordance with their man-orientation; however, the principle extends to in box defending, as willingness to face crosses by emphasising central compactness both vertically and horizontally opportunities such as when the opponent can play a diagonal behind the defence into free wide areas become available. Eric Dier and Cristian Romero’s (esp.) aggressive playstyle, and willingness to engage aerially is huge.
· The doubling up, backwards recycling, centre midfielder stepping up showing the receiving player backwards, lateral or into a finalising action can act as a trigger to engage in higher pressing as Kane stems the flow from the DM, whilst once backwards, the free option for the possession team is typically their far-side deep half-space player, for Aresnal below, Cedric.
· This allows Son, the far-sided winger to pounce if the players touch is heavy, sprinting at the player, showing him central, following the run in-to-out therein while on the (now) far-side, Kulusevski can compact on the far-side CB and Emerson can get ready to jump the far-side FB. The far-side CB covers postionally creating a four whilst the far-side FB now in possession has no options and is forced longer for the forward to contest with Spurs CBs in aerial duels. A common pattern of Spurs more intense pressing.
· Its things like this which is why Pep Guardiola emphasises open body orientation from these players (deep-far-side-half-space-connectors), to show the ball away from the out-to-in desires of the pressing winger looking to prevent overload to isolates. Show the ball into space, then play the pass/carry into space. With enough coordination, situations like this open access to line breaking passes, and at worst, slow the forwards momentum before the pass backwards and allow the attacking team to reconfigure.
· Similar dynamics to the backwards pass from winger to deep-half-space player can occur in higher regions, with the provocation being more abstractly a backwards pass onto a potentially isolatable player, with Kane being able to go ball-side towards the ball-carrier while the far-sided winger presses inwards with intensity to force play back to the goalkeeper. This is more likely to happen when the CB advances and plays wider because the full back is often unable to find a progressive option, leading to the backwards pass sparking intensity. Pressure then on is followed, while midfield players pick up their nearest supporting player to force the keeper long, leading to CB contestation.
· Potential theory behind wanting to generate these isolated defensive dual conditions after pushing the opponent backwards could be because the higher pressing initiated and subsequently opposition dropping as they seek then fail to break out is that it creates transitional conditions as Spurs can maintain their back 4/5 and play out into a vertically stretched pitched primed for automatisms. 4-2-4 ❤️⚽️.
· Sprinting to make up distances, particularly from wingers is a crucial element of this type of pressing. It moreover serves a tempo-changing purpose; pressing which responds to triggers moving from preventative to active can catch opponents off guards, in the consolidated mindset of looking for pass and taking things slowly, only to be forced to act quickly, unexpectedly, and hopefully lacking composure from Spurs perspective.
· Moreover, this strategy can work well from second ball situations where play is contested as back passes to reconsolidate are typically necessary and the flight of the ball can be more unpredictable and difficult to control, favouring sprints.
· A potential weakness of the higher pressing elements of the system is the intensity required to execute them which makes long-term sustainability difficult, particularly as Spurs are ideally a transitional team, as moving from block and sprinting up the pitch to force isolation and long passes presumably takes its physical toll (on that note, just want to mention, Kulu is so good at defensive recoveries once committed).
· Roughly then, the trigger to a higher press is full back ball reception where progressive and lateral options are cut, creating a predictable backwards option to be ran at. Tottenham stretch their defensive line with the near-side winger pushing the ball, near-side midfielder picking up the supporting option, while the centre forward moves into a sprint on the centre back. This can be altered by things such as proximity like the mentioned winger carrying his run when distances are smaller to manipulate passing angles backwards via out-to-in, where the forward then carries his run onto the keeper. Consistent is the trigger: the far-sided winger forcing the FB backwards whilst the midfield pushes up and the wing-backs look to jump any longer wide balls.
· Man-orientation once the compact zonal approach has pushed play into wider regions is thus key, as they firstly limit options by forcing backwards reception of potential receivers which has a compacting effect, making the playable space backwards, from which they subsequently get tight on dropping players, forcing the ball longer to be contested in duels.
· This is not infallible as the picture above shows, as the possession team if composed enough playing out under pressure can maintain the dynamic superiority as use the newly available space to open new passing angles as the forward pressing line becomes stretched.
· When in wider regions where the shape is more stretched and the opponent is progressing, the key remains reactive jumping from the midfielders, they do not follow rigidly, but maintain proximity until the opposing midfielder enters the defensive line, making sure to protect the diagonal passing lane. When the winger commits on the full back, the wing-back must step up tight on the winger.
· Against back three build-up, the wingers are initially in alignment with their respective centre backs; however, there is a degree of ball-sidedness to the response, as the near-sided winger is responsible before the press has been triggered for moving onto the wing back after his positioning showed play there. Upon closing down, the options for the wing-back receiving will be regressive typically as the Spurs wing-back protects the flanks while the winger cuts laterally with the support of the second line holistically compacting play and marking options. So, they start high and narrow, move backwards upon the ball-side being chosen if they are on the ball-side, looking to move onto the full back. Similar principles apply in a four, considering many back 5’s move to a stretched four in deep build-up, hence, the important thing is narrow-to-wide recovery as they look to come in behind on the ball-sided deep wide player. This makes the full back the free pass, to be pressed by the winger, with a predictable supporting backwards pass, which creates the predictability necessary to safely engage in higher pressing efforts.
· This generates as similar theme whereby the near-side midfielder can then step out more vertically onto the opponents near-sided centre back, creating a chain where the forward can move onto the deepest CCB and the far-sided winger goes onto the far-side deep half-space player (far-side CB). The far-side wing-back can then step up once possession has circulated, adopting holistic ball-side man-orientation with the centre midfielder having the potential to jump any passes, as they have the dynamic superiority attacking the space compared to the static opponent. Dropping forwards are moreover tracked by their respective centre backs in between the 2nd and 3rd lines.
· In the case of shorter interceptions the dynamic superiority is key, as Spurs players run into duels with speed and aggression, seeking to win the ball back instantly, with the creation of the predictable chain of response through the gradual stepping up and encroachment being crucial in allowing what would otherwise be overzealous.
· Extending from this, following your run to carry momentum with others filling in is a feature, because it cuts the lane from where the pass originated and permits more fluid transitions.
· A key way of preventing Spurs from pressing higher is to add depth to the defensive line to increase the physical load of sprints and thus discourage them. There will often be reticence to go too far ‘out of position’ from the midfielders closing the deep half-space players. Think of it as, adding depth before the opposition press forces you to, allowing for better preparation to engage subsequently.
· When counterpressing or recovering from a turnover in deeper regions the principles seem fairly simple as the player nearest the ball, typical the one who has lost it deeper, or the intended receiver in more advanced regions closes it down. If there is good proximity another will help while man-orientation is adopted nearby when counterpressing whereas deeper possession losses are typically oriented around showing the ball backwards to regroup rather than engaging in risky duels.
To summarise, Spurs have a reactive defensive style facilitated by maintaining numerical superiorities and a compact centre. Notably, the wing-backs do not engage higher in mid-to-low block circumstances to maintain flexibility and the winger tracks back to show play itself backwards. The near-sided midfielder stepping up is probably the most common of triggers to engage as it attempts to force an action, with this more forcing nature even in a passive block being crucial to preventing the opponent from sustaining dangerous pressure. Similarly, to Conte’s Inter, the defensive line is well-coordinated allowing for the in-to-out nature of the man-oriented pressing and ball-side compaction to occur fluidly. While lacking a higher press which produces turnovers directly, the approach used by Spurs means they are very rarely left in transitional circumstances once the press is beaten as they have sufficient cover in the back 5 largely inactive until opposing attacks begin to drop in between the 2nd and 3rd lines. This press does however produce long balls to recover possession from, meaning it is a lower risk/lower reward style which seeks to produce deeper possession. Here is a summery of general players roles – which while inadequate by itself, hopefully makes sense with the holistic contextualisation this post has attempted to provide.
CBs: Man-oriented coverage within respective zones, when the opponent commits to the ball-side, fluidly adapt, and use their movements to support as a compacting trigger. Applies in horizontally in addition to vertical circumstances. They will track in between the 2nd and 3rd lines whilst moreover tracking runs in-to-out. Each has a roughly corresponding zonal responsibility in 3 of the 5 zones.
WBs: Maintain positioning within line, only jump when the winger has committed and a predictable pass down the line is anticipatable. Cover for tracking centre backs via compaction to form a four. Use man as a reference point behind horizontal positioning – compact when necessary and press in-to-out with a body orientation that blocks central access as the key. In higher pressing circumstances, track respective winger by maintaining proximity before jumping. Not rigidly tight to allow for positional manipulation via spinning countermovement’s. Out to in opposition movement is passed on.
CMs: Near-side step up on deep half-space player who it is key to maintain proximity to. In higher pressing, be man-oriented to supporting midfielders and follow runs if they play a wall pass. Zonally compact in mid-to-low block circumstances.
Ws: Stay narrow in higher pressing circumstances to make play more directional and then use in-to-out pressing to sprint back onto the now ball-carrier after forcing the opposition decision. Strong connection to near-side midfielder in mid-to-low block circumstances to negate central progression through compaction potential when the space opens up due to the pressing trigger. Maintain good distance to the opposing full back in mid-block phases and seek to show play backwards when pressing, cutting half-space angles with body-orientation. In the low-block, double up with similar body posturing, track the under/overlap when needed, push up when the near-sided midfielder presses in these situations. Far-sided, maintain good proximity to their far-side half space player while zonally compacting with the team, sprint to make up distances if necessary. If the player looks isolated, or takes a committal/heavy touch, use that as a pressing trigger to engage higher with supporting team man-orientation. Higher pressing on the far-side requires engagement with opposing centre back as the wing-back makes up ground to support and the team shuttles accordingly.
CF: Stay near opposing defensive midfielder to force U shape possession for recycling and generally make opposing play more directional. Only commit to CB’s when higher pressing is triggered on the near-side as the winger has the far-side covered.