I
Our age is one of hyper-compactness. Finding space in central areas is becoming increasingly difficult as teams become increasingly coordinated defensively to limit time and space both on the ball and in between the lines. Pinning approaches like that of a 4-1-5 which rely on qualitative superiorities and combination play on the flanks to force commitment and use the magnetism of unstoppable guys can frequently be too slow and ineffectual to exploit gaps which appear in behind because the connection from full-back to winger is weak. In these systems, circulation is strong, but infiltration is difficult, a pathology perhaps best emblemised by Spain at the World Cup, playing an unstoppable guy system while distinctly lacking one (let only two). And while this post should not be viewed as denigrating the 4-1-5 approach, it seeks to provide an alternative while working in a similar framework, which perhaps embraces the vicissitudes of verticality to a greater extent.
A pinning approach which uses the magnetism of wingers to gradually progress play, force the opposition behind the ball and abide by Juanma lillo’s precept of the quicker the ball goes forward, the quicker it comes back, is defensively nonpareil. After all, Pep Guardiola is the most defensive manager in the world
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But the insistence on control abstractly can produce rigidity and turgid play which kills the pace of the game for both teams in an attempt to maximise legibility and minimise uncontrollable factors. Obsessing over ball turnovers in a possession heavy system only makes sense, it is where you get killed, and risk aversion, most notably aversion to the greatest risk, losing the ball, can produce a similar paradigm to that of a deep block. Microcosmically, at every instance, the low risk, high chance of success but low payoff decision may seem rational, and it increasingly becomes so as the clock ticks down and you have a favourable game-state where reducing variance is crucial; however, macrocosmically, a pathological aversion to risk prevents the creation of chances and in the long-run hurts. A potential solution to this is to "Rule creators in", players like Bruno Fernandes or João Cancelo who will often try things which make you question their sanity, but are incredibly effective players precisely because of their vision (and execution). Having specified role players with greater freedom from constraint within an overall effective system which seeks to produce control. This is a player profile solution, and one which I like, where players known for their speculation are placed within a system designed to limit randomness, where hopefully the two elements can interact to form a better equilibrium, producing a yin and yang effect. However, this post will explore the 4-2-4 from consolidated possession as a more systemic method to creating transitions quickly.
II
The logic behind a higher 4-2-4 is unsurprisingly similar to my preference for deeper 4-2-4 in build-up insofar as it allows strong central connections to be maintained while permitting the widening of the full backs to strengthen their connection to the winger, decreasing travel time and improving the potential for combination play with the falnks. The logic I’ve generally used to justify 4-2-4 deep is the greater vertical playing field when building out of pressure necessitates wider full backs to effectively stretch the pitch as to make the wingers active actors in possession, something not typically necessary on the more compact effective pitch of half-way line possession.
However, if you’re looking to transition quickly, having shorter distances is crucial regardless, so shortening the distances in a field where speed is still important because of the more compact defence remains sound. The double pivot pins the opposition centrally and offers support to the full back upon reception preventing quick isolation from opposition pressure. The player in the advanced half-space is needed to provide a passing option for the full back to create space for the winger (and generally be a threat to receive and drop at any moment) and then support the winger upon their reception of possession through an underlapping run. These progression dynamics which are common make having a central striker in these phases irrelevant as it works under the axiom that the centre of the pitch in between the 2nd and 3rd lines will automatically be the most compact zone, incredibly difficult to access which will be covered irrespective of static occupation because of the enormous threat that comes with dynamic occupation.
Compared to a 4-1-5, in the 4-2-4, the striker is sacrificed for a deeper midfielder which allows for safe circulation with wider full backs, meaning play is not overly committal, while nevertheless maintaining a strong transitional threat through the potential for wide combination play. When progressing into the final third, a cascading effect can occur in a transition towards a 3-2-5 where central box occupation becomes more pertinent as the far-side half-space player can narrow, as to can the far-side winger, or alternatively the full back can step up and occupy the half-space. I think dribbling and good close control to resist pressure (in the sense of evading opponents, rather than beating them 1v1) is a crucial skill which generates more flexibility and allows for more suitable occupations of roles following interchanges, but this could be due to a personal preference for universality of attacking players rather than something necessary.
Find the full back in space
Connect with the winger with underlapping supporting run
Infiltrate inside and find the far side
There is an extreme emphasis in this system on the quick recycling provided by the double pivot, who alongside pinning the defensive line seek to receive back to goal to play a wall pass, or in moments of defensive lapse when there is overzealous anticipation from wingers can look to turn, face and progress directly. They mainly recycle to the centre backs who look for transitional openings. The full backs remain wide, not touchline width, but in the half-half-space as I like to call it, narrow but in the wider region of the pitch – thinking of the end of the 18-yard box is probably best (the abstract nature of the post makes everything seem more geometric than it is and is based predominately on assumptions on how elite teams defend and which spaces are available). Additionally caveats such as the necessity to move into a 4-1-5 with a dropping DM, higher and wider FB, narrowing winger rotation should be noted (this could remain a 4-2-4 with the half-space player being shuffled by the winger narrowing coming deeper to receive and play a bounce pass).
Focus on shapes is necessarily reductive because the complexity is introduced by the relations and abilities of the gladiators out here (not tennis players, Tom Cruise) and how they interpret the entry stucture. Exit and entries structures more generally are the best why I have of conceptualising De Zerbism – there are clear ways to achieve access to space in between the lines, how the players deal with compaction is spontaneous, as necessitated by the more chaotic conditions, while the far-side remains structured upon exit to best continue to the transition and attack space as play becomes more predictable (think KDB charging down the half-space, Mahrez to his right, Haaland menacingly hunting centrally). Overall, I don’t think conceptualising the role of a coach in tactical possession sense as potentially somebody who provides the stucture for clean entries and exits is wrong.
III
The post has been focused on shape is because it is abstract allowing the discussion to occur without direct reference to explicit examples and be more holistic and secondly because there are assumptions baked into my articulations of particular shapes which imply various forms of staggering, movements and spacing influenced through watching teams like Brighton and Manchester City, which become axiomatic reference points. Shapes often represent a static picture – the 4-2-4 which occurs after Lewis Dunk confidently controls the ball with his sole, and the subsequent actions implied from that such as the far-sided member of the double pivot narrowing when facing man-orientation to provide a bounce option to the far-side CB to open the midfield passing lane. The more dynamic the game state becomes, the less useful the 4-2-4 idea is in application. It is meant to be a launching point for recycling and establishing connections prior to transitions and consequently all actions thereafter are influenced by the initial base but require rotations and improvisations to adapt to the opponents defending and their fellow teammates decisions. Its this reason I like having 4 players with good close control and are comfortable receiving back to goal in the front line. Sterling, Bernardo, Jesus, Mahrez; Mitoma, Trossard, Lallana, March; Boga, Đuričić, Caputo, Berardi. You can rotate and reconsolidate without losing much in any position, I think the 4-2-4 from higher settings perhaps more than any other system prizes universality amongst its attackers because of the desired fluidity in quick transitional moments combined with the overall emphasis on recycling and waiting for the correct moment to bounce – using static game states to control when to go fast and slow.
Without sounding too evangelical, watch Brighton or Shakhtar (more 4-1-5 in UPL), or Sassuolo before them under de Zerbi to understand the more handwavy elements presented such as the entry and exit concepts. Use the 4-2-4 and its base for connections and the theory behind why it is suitable for high possession, patient but quick transition teams – moving slow, then pouncing, but with backwards recycling contingencies. Ultimately, against deep and compact opponents a 4-2-4 will struggle because it lack can force issues where none exist or risk falling into the 4-1-5 possession trap but with a worse stucture for higher possession, hence de Zerbi predominately using a 4-1-5 in the UPL. However, it offers a good alternative when facing a more traditionally compact/hyper-compact mid-block which allows for easier exploitation of wider zones vulnerable in such systems without sacrificing central control. Sometimes an advanced central option is pointless, because teams prepare around and must defend such a figure, whether they exist or not, and therefore, only when the small touches and micro-decisions to create a yard of space for decisive actions are needed, should the last line of the centre be occupied, something possible in the 4-2-4-to-3-2-5 transition.
Addendum:
Part one was kind of playing a character, I don’t believe many of the issues associated with the 4-1-5 and think its perfectly fitting at the elite level right now (Gunners on top of the Premier League) and think its yet to reach its zenith. But, for teams without super-hybrid midfielders like Bernarndo who can fluidly interchange between 4-2-4 and 4-1-5 (with two AM profiles), the 4-2-4 provides a good alternative to breaking down deep block which can facilitate having two more traditional holding midfielders. Or perhaps a team lacking a top quality centre forward. Overall, in the abstract the 4-1-5 consolidated, 4-2-4 transitional paradigm seems to still be optimal, but 4-2-4 may come to the fore overall as teams look to exploit spaces left by compact mid-blocks.